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The relationship between law and philosophy is easily and often overstated.  In 
this dissertation, I shed some light on the appropriate relationship between law and 
philosophy.  The primary problem I identify is confusing a conceptual issue for a 
practical one.  While theory can help clarify almost any problem, it has limits.  And it is 
just as important to understand the limits as to understand the theory.   
This dissertation begins to identify some of those limits as they relate to legal 
issues.  The dissertation explores the appropriate use of philosophy of language in 
arguments concerning how to interpret legal texts, especially constitutions.  It then points 
out the futility of attempting to clarify legal doctrine with more precise definitions, such 
as definitions of “religion” and “commercial speech.”  Finally, it explores the relationship 
between philosophical debates concerning free will and legal debates over the extent to 
which free will is relevant to legal accountability.  The legal lesson is that current trends 
to treat brain science as dispositive of issues concerning legal accountability should be 
viewed with skepticism.  
In the end, I hope to convince the reader that, while the methods of philosophy are 
valuable to those analyzing law, the conclusions of philosophers are more likely to cause 
confusion than clarity if they are imported into the decisions judges make in interpreting 
law.  For those engaged in interdisciplinary work in the two areas, the message is not 
“stop,” but “proceed with caution.” 
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The relationship between law and philosophy is easily and often overstated.  The 
temptation to consider philosophical debates directly relevant to law frequently stems 
either from law professors hoping to find additional support for their legal positions with 
misunderstood philosophy or from philosophy professors hoping to make practical their 
arguments by mistranslating them into legal arguments, or so it might be hypothesized.  
Regardless of the explanation, there are many examples of scholars in both disciplines 
overstating the relationship between law and philosophy.  My focus here, however, will 
be on the misuse of philosophy in legal scholarship.   
In this dissertation, I hope to shed some light on the appropriate relationship 
between law and philosophy.  By law, I mean primarily the rules and principles 
interpreted and applied by judges, including such things as common law, statutes, 
administrative rules, treaties, and constitutions.  I recognize that there is law that escapes 
this definition because it does not lend itself to judicial interpretation, such as legal rules 
interpreted and applied exclusively by the political branches.  But most of what we 
consider law, or at least most of what we consider law that leads to the misunderstood 
relationship with philosophy, is captured by my definition.   
By philosophy, I mean such things as metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of 
language, moral theory, political philosophy, and applied ethics.  As with law, it is 
perhaps easiest to define the discipline by what those considered to work in the discipline 
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do.  In the case of philosophy, that would include the debates and arguments of 
philosophers.  While the boundaries of law and philosophy may be imprecise, borderline 
cases will not be my focus.  For my purposes it is enough to focus upon what is 
undisputedly philosophy and undisputedly law, as sufficient confusion exists over their 
relationship to fill this dissertation.   
In the end, I hope to convince the reader that, while the methods of philosophy are 
valuable to those analyzing law, the conclusions of philosophers are more likely to cause 
confusion than clarity if they are imported into the decisions judges make in interpreting 
law.  For those engaged in interdisciplinary work in the two areas, the message is not 
“stop,” but “proceed with caution.” 
 
Summary of Chapters 
 
This dissertation divides into four chapters.  Each chapter is an example of the 
difficulties of transporting the substance of philosophical debates to legal debates.  The 
chapters have been published in the journal of Law and Philosophy, The John Marshall 
Law Review, George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal, and as a book chapter 
in Moral Psychology Today:  Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will.   
Chapter 1 highlights an inappropriate use of philosophy of language in arguments 
concerning how to interpret legal texts, especially constitutions.  Ronald Dworkin 
employs a version of the semantic/pragmatic distinction to argue that constitutional 
provisions should be interpreted to make them the best they can be, morally speaking.  I 
argue that once the semantic/pragmatic distinction is properly understood, the only light 
that distinction sheds on constitutional interpretation is to confirm what most people 
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naturally believe, namely that constitutional text should be interpreted in accordance with 
what those who drafted it were trying to say and those originally governed by it 
understood the drafters to say.  In the end, the hunt for what the framers meant by 
constitutional text is not different in kind from, for example, the hunt for what David 
Hume meant in the Treatise on Human Nature.  We are not searching for what we would 
have meant were we writing the Treatise on Human Nature today, but for what Hume 
meant when he wrote it.  Dworkin’s employment of philosophy of language serves only 
to obscure this point. 
Chapter 2 highlights a problem with importing philosophical debates over the 
nature of a concept into debates over how to interpret a particular use of that concept in a 
legal text.  Legal scholars often draw upon debates over the nature of religion and what 
qualifies as a religion in developing theories of how to interpret the Religion Clauses in 
the First Amendment.  I analyze a number of these attempts to define “religion” for 
constitutional purposes and argue that reliance upon those philosophical debates only 
adds to the interpretative confusion.  What this chapter reveals is that rarely is it fruitful 
to focus on concepts instead of particular conceptions when interpreting legal texts.  The 
legal purpose of the text should govern the definitions of its words, regardless of whether 
those definitions are precise by philosophical standards.  Philosophical debates 
concerning semantic content have little significance in interpreting legal texts.   
Chapter 3 further illustrates the problem identified in Chapter 2 by describing the 
problems encountered by the United States Supreme Court in attempting to distinguish 
commercial and noncommercial speech for purposes of the Free Speech Clause.  The 
example illustrates how legal interpretation is so practical in nature that placing too much 
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emphasis upon definitions not only distorts legal analysis, but, more important, also strips 
the law of predictability, a characteristic philosophy can live without, but law cannot.  
For this reason, boundaries between commercial and noncommercial speech should be 
abandoned or drawn in a manner that judges can identify the boundary and citizens 
typically can predict the location of that boundary without judicial intervention. 
Chapter 4 provides a different kind of example of the relationship between law 
and philosophy.  It illustrates how philosophy can help those engaging in legal analysis 
from taking wrong turns, even if philosophy cannot definitively indicate the direction 
legal analysis should take.  The example involves the relationship between philosophical 
debates concerning free will and legal debates over the extent to which free will is 
relevant to legal accountability.  The legal lesson is that current trends to treat brain 
science as dispositive of issues concerning legal accountability should be viewed with 
skepticism.  Such science must be filtered morally to have relevance to accountability, 
which means such science should not be used to show, for example, compulsion as a 
matter of law to excuse otherwise criminal behavior or that it would be unconstitutional 
to hold someone legally culpable given their brain state.  Instead, science is relevant for 
juries determining guilt and policymakers who inject moral considerations into law.   
In the end, hopefully these examples will shed some light on the relationship 
between law and philosophy and give some pause to those attempting to import one 
discipline to the other.  The primary problem exemplified in those examples is confusing 
a conceptual issue for a practical one.  While theory can help clarify almost any problem, 
it has limits.  And it is as important to understand the limits as to understand the theory.  







PUTTING MEANING IN ITS PLACE 
 
Introduction 
Originalism has become the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation, 
with legal scholars as diverse as Justice Antonin Scalia and Ronald Dworkin among its 
advocates (Ackerman 1991; 1998; Amar 1998; Barnett 1999; 2003; Dworkin 1997a; 
1997b; Flaherty 1995; Lessig 1997; McConnell 1997; Moore 2001; Perry 1994; Scalia 
1997; Treanor 1995; Whittington 1999).  Current originalists advocate fidelity to 
constitutional text,2 but disagree about what such fidelity requires.3  To settle these 
disagreements, it seems natural to expect originalists to employ (at least implicitly) 
conclusions and arguments from philosophy of language.  Ronald Dworkin does just this 
                                                 
1 Reprinted with with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.  Springer, Law & 
Philosophy, Putting Meaning in Its Place: Originalism and Philosophy of Language, Vol. 25, 2006, 387-
416, Troy L. Booher 
2 An important recent shift in focus for many originalists has been from concern only with the subjective 
intent of those who drafted the Constitution to concern with how the text itself was originally understood or 
the “objective” intent of the drafters.  This shift explains originalism’s recent resurgence as an acceptable 
method of constitutional interpretation for many legal scholars.  For a discussion of this point, see Barnett 
(2003). 
3 I do not directly address fidelity to prior interpretations of the Constitution, although precedent ultimately 
must be addressed by anyone advancing a method of constitutional interpretation.  Whatever interpretative 
method one adopts (unless it advocates uncritically following precedent), there will be instances in which 
precedent is at odds with the result one would reach independent of precedent.  For this reason, all methods 
of interpretation ultimately must have something to say about the role of precedent.  For a recent discussion 
of how originalists might deal with precedent, see Barnett (2005). 
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to argue against other originalist interpretations and to advocate what he calls a moral 
reading of the Constitution. 
Dworkin’s arguments for his moral reading of the Constitution are inconclusive 
because, and to the extent, they employ unwarranted philosophical assumptions about 
how to interpret texts.  As a result of these deficiencies, the originalist position outlined 
by Dworkin unexpectedly collapses into the position of his most vociferous originalist 
rival, Justice Scalia. 
The argument proceeds in five stages.  The first stage explains Scalia’s and 
Dworkin’s originalist methods for interpreting the Constitution, using the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment to illustrate.  The 
second stage outlines Dworkin’s argument for rejecting Scalia’s method and preferring 
his own.  The third stage scrutinizes Dworkin’s argument to expose unwarranted 
philosophical assumptions about how to interpret texts.  The fourth stage shows that 
philosophy of language teaches us that interpreting constitutional text requires 
considerable attention to the historical context in which it was enacted.  The final stage 
demonstrates that, contrary to Dworkin’s previous position in Law’s Empire, discerning 
the historical understanding of legal texts is not impossible and indeed is presupposed in 
Dworkin’s more recent work.  The aim of this chapter is to show not only that Dworkin’s 
argument leaves Scalia’s method of constitutional interpretation unscathed, but also that 
Scalia’s method should be the starting point for anyone concerned with fidelity to 
constitutional text. 
 
Two Versions of Originalism 
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In explaining his method of interpreting constitutional text, Scalia first points out 
the tension he sees between democracy and common law judging.  According to Scalia, 
insofar as common law judges make law when they decide cases, common law judging is 
dangerous to democracy because where “the power of judging [is] joined with legislative, 
the life and liberty of the subject [is] exposed to arbitrary controul, for the judge . . . then 
[is] the legislator” (Scalia 1997, 10).  According to Scalia, our legal system guards 
against this danger with separation of powers, and partly because of this, ours is “a 
government of laws and not of men,” where the “text is the law, and it is the text that 
must be observed” (Scalia 1997, 22, 25).  Proper interpretation of the Constitution thus 
requires fidelity to the text itself.  On this much, Dworkin and Scalia (and most every 
other legal scholar) agree.4  
Scalia then explains how to interpret the text of the Constitution.  The “original 
meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended” determines how the 
Constitution should be interpreted (Scalia 1997, 38).  Writings by the framers are 
important only because they reveal how intelligent and informed people at the time 
understood the Constitution.  For Scalia, the content of the Constitution does not change 
over time; yet the Constitution covers new circumstances not specifically contemplated at 
the time of ratification if a reasonable (intelligent and informed) person’s understanding 
of the text at the time suggests this result.  Simply put, Scalia’s theory instructs a judge to 
determine, to the extent possible, how a reasonable person at the time of ratification 
understood the Constitution and then to apply that result to the present case. 
                                                 




To illustrate, Scalia provides an example of how to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.  Scalia argues that 
capital punishment is not unconstitutional, at least in part, because capital punishment “is 
explicitly contemplated in the Constitution” (Scalia 1997, 46).  The Fifth Amendment 
provides that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law or held to 
answer for a capital crime without a grand jury indictment.  These provisions, coupled 
with the fact that capital punishment was inflicted before and after ratification, make it 
unlikely that a reasonable person’s understanding of the Eighth Amendment in 1791 was 
that it prohibited capital punishment.  Because of such evidence, Scalia interprets the 
Eighth Amendment to permit each state and the federal government to decide whether to 
inflict or to forbid capital punishment. 
Dworkin agrees with Scalia that proper constitutional interpretation requires 
fidelity to the text itself.  Dworkin, however, distinguishes text “drafted in exceedingly 
abstract moral language”—for example, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses—
from the rest of the Constitution (Dworkin 1996, 7).  Dworkin interprets the nonabstract 
clauses—for example, the requirement that the President be at least 35 years of age—in 
the same way as Scalia.  Dworkin claims that the abstract clauses, however, “must be 
understood in the way their language most naturally suggests:  they refer to abstract 
moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government’s power” 
(Dworkin 1996, 7).  The abstract nature of these clauses implies that judges should “do 
their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and revise, generation by generation, the 
skeleton of freedom and equality of concern that its great clauses, in their majestic 
9 
 
abstraction, command”5 (Dworkin 1994, 145).  Scalia would reject Dworkin’s conclusion 
that judges should “construct, reinspect, and revise” because this describes the method of 
common law judges in tension with principles of separation of powers.   
Dworkin’s support for his moral reading of the abstract clauses is as follows:  
“Enlightenment statesmen were very unlikely to think that their own views represented 
the last word in moral progress [and, if they had,] . . . they would have made plain that 
they intended to create a dated provision” (Dworkin 1997a, 124).  For this reason, 
Dworkin reads the abstract clauses to express abstract moral principles, which implicitly 
instruct judges to use their best moral judgment to interpret these clauses.  Dworkin then 
concludes that “the application of these abstract principles to particular cases, which 
takes fresh judgment, must be continually reviewed, not in an attempt to find substitutes 
for what the Constitution says, but out of respect for what it says” (Dworkin 1997a, 122).  
Dworkin believes that judges sometimes should interpret a provision of the Constitution 
in a way that is not in accordance with how the provision was understood at the time of 
ratification or intended by those who drafted the document. 
To illustrate, consider how Dworkin interprets the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition, which reads, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”6  “If the correct interpretation is 
the abstract one, then judges attempting to keep faith with the text today must sometimes 
ask themselves whether punishments the framers would not themselves have considered 
                                                 
5 While Dworkin is the best example of one who holds this view, he is not alone.  For example, Lawrence 
Sager argues that because certain provisions of the Constitution express “broad structural propositions and 
moral generalities,” the text itself obligates those interpreting it to use independent moral judgment “to fill 
in these general stipulations with concrete applications, to fashion workable and defensible conceptions of 
the Constitution’s moral concepts” (Sager 1998, 238).  Jack Balkin recently has advanced similar 
arguments (Balkin 2007). 
6 U.S. Const. amend. 8. 
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cruel . . . nevertheless, are cruel”7 (Dworkin 1997b, 1253).  This is because the term 
“cruel,” as it appears in the Eighth Amendment, means “punishments that are in fact—
according to the correct standards for deciding such matters—cruel” (Dworkin 1997b, 
1252).  If our best moral reasoning tells us that capital punishment is cruel, which 
Dworkin believes it does, then capital punishment is unconstitutional despite the fact that 
this result conflicts with the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment.  
 
Dworkin’s Argument 
Dworkin distinguishes two kinds of intention in order to argue against Scalia.  
Dworkin points out the difference between “what some officials intended to say in 
enacting the language they used, and what they intended—or expected or hoped—would 
be the consequence of their saying it”8 (Dworkin 1997a, 116).  Dworkin calls the former 
“semantic intentions” and the latter “political intentions” (Dworkin 1997b, 1255).  An 
example will illustrate the difference.  Suppose that I tell a rebellious adolescent that she 
should not attend college.  However, I expect and hope she will do the opposite—enroll 
in college—just to be rebellious.  What I said was that she should not attend college, but 
what I expected to occur as a result was that she would attend college.  In fact, it was 
crucial that my words did not convey what I expected to occur.  So Dworkin correctly 
observes that what one expects to occur as a result of speaking is not always the same as 
what one says. 
                                                 
7 Notice, however, that Dworkin, without explanation, simply ignores the words “and unusual” in the 
provision. 
8 Although Dworkin never cites him, Michael Moore recognized the importance of these distinctions for 
constitutional interpretation as early as 1985 (1985).  Moore similarly distinguished an “intention to 
accomplish certain effects” from an intention to mean something by using certain words, what Moore 
called “semantic intentions” (1985, 339).   
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Dworkin calls an originalism concerned with semantic intentions “semantic 
originalism” and an originalism concerned with political intentions “expectation 
originalism” (Dworkin 1997a, 119).  According to Dworkin, semantic originalism 
“insists that the rights-granting[, abstract] clauses be read to say what those who made 
them intended to say,” whereas expectation originalism “holds that these clauses should 
be understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to 
have” (Dworkin 1997a, 119).  Dworkin (1997a) provides an example to illustrate the 
difference:   
Suppose a boss tells his manager (without winking) to hire the most 
qualified applicant for a new job.  The boss might think it obvious that his 
own son, who is an applicant, is the most qualified; indeed he might not 
have given the instruction unless he was confident that the manager would 
think so too.  Nevertheless, what the boss said, and intended to say, was 
that the most qualified applicant should be hired, and if the manager 
thought some other applicant better qualified, but hired the boss’s son to 
save his own job, he would not be following the standard the boss had 
intended to lay down. (116-17) 
Dworkin believes that evidence of how the framers or ratifiers would have 
expected provisions of the Constitution to be applied in specific cases is irrelevant to 
determining how to interpret constitutional text, just as the boss’s expectation that his son 
will be hired is irrelevant to determining how to interpret what the boss said.  
When Dworkin’s distinction between semantic originalism and expectation 
originalism is applied to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on inflicting cruel and 
unusual punishment, the upshot becomes apparent.  Dworkin (1997a) drives the point 
home as follows: 
[An expectation originalist] supposes that the framers intended to say, by 
using the words “cruel and unusual,” that punishments generally thought 
cruel at the time they spoke were to be prohibited - that is, that they would 
have expressed themselves more clearly if they had used the phrase 
“punishments widely regarded as cruel and unusual at the date of this 
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enactment” in place of the misleading language they actually used. [A 
semantic originalist] supposes that they intended to lay down an abstract 
principle forbidding whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual. 
(120) 
When this distinction is properly understood, Dworkin argues, it becomes clear 
that current judges should exercise their best moral judgment to decide whether capital 
punishment is cruel and therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
Evaluating Dworkin’s Argument 
At first glance, Dworkin’s argument against Scalia appears decisive.  Scalia cites 
how the framers understood and would have applied the Eighth Amendment as evidence 
of how to interpret that provision.  As will become apparent, however, Dworkin’s 
distinction between semantic intentions and political intentions does not help to clarify 
how to interpret constitutional text.  To understand why this is so, we must look more 
closely at why Dworkin believes that the evidence Scalia cites would be “irrelevant” for a 
semantic originalist (Dworkin 1997a, 120, 123-24). 
The evidence Scalia cites to support his interpretation of the Eighth Amendment 
is as follows:  (i) explicit references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment, 
(ii) the widespread practice of capital punishment after enactment, (iii) the framers’ intent 
to embed the moral values of the time in the Bill of Rights, and (iv) the framers’ aversion 
to leaving the development of “an evolving national morality” to judges instead of 
elected officials (Scalia 1997; Dworkin 1997a).  For Scalia, such evidence supports his 
reading of the Eighth Amendment as permitting capital punishment.  Other than drawing 
and relying upon a distinction between semantic intentions and political intentions, 
however, Dworkin never explains specifically why such evidence is irrelevant to 
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interpreting constitutional text.  Let’s consider how Dworkin’s distinction could be doing 
this work. 
There are two ways of understanding Dworkin’s wholesale rejection of the 
evidence cited by Scalia.  First, Dworkin may be employing a distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics to maintain that political intentions are irrelevant to 
determining what Dworkin sometimes calls the “natural semantic meaning” of the text 
(Dworkin 1997a, 124).  For instance, when Dworkin asserts that the broad language used 
in the Eighth Amendment dictates his moral reading of the clause, he seems to be 
claiming that it is the semantic content of the words in the clause that leads to his 
interpretation; that is, the extension of the term “cruel” may well encompass capital 
punishment even though a majority of native English speakers in the United States in 
1791 and today believe otherwise.  Second, Dworkin may agree that some pragmatic 
facts, such as background assumptions of the framers, are relevant to interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment, but nonetheless may claim that what Dworkin calls political 
intentions are irrelevant pragmatic facts.  Ultimately, either way of understanding 
Dworkin’s argument fails to support the claim that the evidence Scalia cites is irrelevant 
to interpreting the Eighth Amendment. 
 
Semantics and Pragmatics 
It is well known that in uttering a sentence one can imply more than “what is 
said,” where what is said is identified with the semantic content of one’s utterance.  That 
is, the meaning conveyed when one utters some words can vary as the context in which 
one utters those words varies.  For example, irony and sarcasm are not fully captured by 
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the semantic content of the words speakers use.  Facts about the words one utters are not 
the only facts relevant to interpreting one’s utterance.   
We can crudely call “pragmatic facts” all nonsemantic facts—such as facts about 
context—that are relevant to utterance interpretation.9  Consider the following examples 
designed to help flesh out (at least the intuitive sense of) the distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics.10 
First, I utter the sentence “I tried to get to work today” after I successfully arrive 
at work.  Intuitively, what I uttered seems at least inappropriate and perhaps false.  At 
first glance, this seems to create a problem for semantics because, strictly speaking, the 
sentence I uttered expresses something true as long as I did not arrive at work 
inadvertently.  After all, typically one at least has tried to get to work when one arrives at 
work.  To avoid locating the inappropriateness with the semantic content of the words, 
many philosophers, most notably Paul Grice, separate semantic content from implications 
reasonably derived by the addressee given certain pragmatic principles governing 
conversation, in Grice’s terms, “conversational maxims” (Grice 1989, 26).  On Grice’s 
account, the inappropriateness of what I uttered is not explained by the semantic content 
of the words, but rather by certain pragmatic principles, such as “make your contribution 
as informative as is required” and “do not make your contribution more information than 
is required” (Grice 1989, 26.)  Our intuition that uttering the sentence is at best 
inappropriate need not be reflected in the semantic content of the term “try” as long as we 
                                                 
9 I say “crudely” because context plays an important role in semantics as well, e.g., the semantic content of 
indexicals (Kaplan 1989). 
10 Although there are many different distinctions the semantics/pragmatics distinction may be shedding 
light upon, e.g., the type/token distinction, the sentence/utterance distinction, the meaning/use distinction, 
the linguistic meaning/speaker’s meaning distinction—it is not necessary to settle upon any one of these 
distinctions here.  Whether we consider interpreting a particular constitutional provision to be interpreting a 
sentence token, utterance interpretation, determining how language was used, or discovering speaker 
meaning, we must attend to pragmatic facts to perform the required task properly. 
15 
 
can attribute it to pragmatic facts, such as pragmatic principles governing conversion or 
perhaps certain background assumptions understood by the addressee (Szabo 2005a). 
Second, assume that in a letter of recommendation for a student applying for a 
philosophy job, the student’s professor writes as follows:  “X has great command of the 
English language, and his attendance in class was regular.”11  While the message that the 
student is not a good candidate for the job is not contained in the semantic content of 
words uttered by the professor, nonetheless it is the message the professor intended to 
convey, and the addressee should have understood as being conveyed, given the context 
in which the words were uttered.  In contrast, if someone has just questioned the student’s 
progress in mastering English because of poor attendance in the professor’s class, the 
utterance is conveying a different message altogether.  The difference is typically 
explained by differences in pragmatic facts, not differences in semantic content.  In 
Grice’s terms, while what the professor said may not have changed, what the professor 
meant did change. 
In his boss example, Dworkin seems to presuppose some formulation of the 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics when he declares that we should be 
interested only in “what was said” (Dworkin 1997a, 116-17; 1997b, 1255).  Dworkin 
claims that the boss instructed that whoever, as a matter of fact, is most qualified should 
be hired, even if the manager reasonably understood the boss to believe that his son is the 
most qualified applicant and “might not have given the instruction unless he was 
confident that the manager would think so too” (Dworkin 1997a, 116-17).  Dworkin’s 
claim seems correct as long as we draw a distinction between semantics and pragmatics 
and identify “what is said” with the semantic content of the words uttered by the boss.  
                                                 
11 This is a variation on Grice’s example (Grice 1989, 33). 
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While the context of the conversation may lead the manager to understand the boss’s 
instruction as directing him to hire the son, it does not follow from this that the semantic 
content of the words informs the manager to hire the son.  Pragmatic facts may affect the 
way the manager reasonably interprets the utterance, but they need not affect the 
semantic content of the words uttered.  In this way, Dworkin can maintain that the boss’s 
expectation (political intention) that his son be hired is irrelevant to interpreting the 
boss’s instruction. 
If Dworkin is relying on a traditional distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics, then his argument rests upon highly contentious ground.  Even among those 
philosophers who accept that the distinction is illuminating, most of them recognize that 
the distinction is particularly problematic (Szabo 2005a; Kadmon 2001; Bach 1999).  
Dworkin should not presuppose, without argument, a certain traditional formulation of 
the distinction to claim that political intentions are irrelevant to constitutional 
interpretation.   
More important, however, assuming there were a noncontentious formulation and 
that tracked what is relevant to determining semantic content, it is unclear why only 
semantic content is relevant to interpreting the Constitution.12  Constitutional 
interpretation involves interpreting particular utterances (written utterances by a group), 
and utterance interpretation has both a semantic and pragmatic component.  As Zoltan 
Szabo has explained when outlining the traditional view held by Grice, “Semantics is 
concerned with what is said, pragmatics with what is implicated, and utterance 
interpretation—the process whereby the addressee ascertains what the speaker meant—
                                                 
12 In fact, it seems doubtful that interpretation is ever wholly independent of pragmatic facts because it is 




has typically both a semantic and pragmatic component”13 (Szabo 2005a, 3).  In other 
words, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is introduced mainly to provide 
a framework in which one can explain how it is that what a speaker conveys can fail to be 
fully determined by the conventional linguistic meaning of the sentence she utters (Bach 
1999).  It is simply a mistake to assume that constitutional interpretation does not involve 
reference to pragmatics. 
Because we are interpreting particular utterances when we interpret the 
Constitution, a distinction between semantics and pragmatics cannot explain why 
political intentions are irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.  Put another way, when 
interpreting the Constitution, we are not concerned with what the language type “cruel 
and unusual punishments” means, but rather we are concerned with how to interpret a 
particular token of “cruel and unusual punishments,” uttered by particular speakers at a 
particular time.  Semantic content, while relevant, is not all that concerns us when 
interpreting language tokens such as the Eighth Amendment.14   
                                                 
13 This is not to ignore the distinction J. L. Austin draws between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.  
The former refers to what one intends to do in uttering certain words (in uttering “Watch out!” I mean to 
warn you that a train is coming), whereas the latter refers to what one intends to accomplish by making the 
utterance (by uttering “Watch out!” I mean to bring you to a halt) (Austin 1962, 83-94).  One reason this 
distinction is important, as Szabo explains, is that it permits one to read Grice as stating that the relevant 
intended effect in the addressee are the illocutionary effects not perlocutionary effects (Szabo 2005a).  This 
does not mean, however, that understanding the intended perlocutionary effect is irrelevant to utterance 
interpretation as Dworkin’s argument requires, but rather that it is not necessary to know the intended 
perlocutionary effect to interpret an utterance properly.  While it may not be necessary to know the age of a 
speaker in Chicago to determine whether she is using the phrase “It’s da bomb” to refer to an explosive 
device, it certainly would be relevant information. 
14 This also explains why attempts to employ a theory of meaning and reference developed by Saul Kripke 
(Kripke 1980) and Hilary Putnam (Kripke 1975) (K-P semantics) to interpret constitutional texts are bound 
to fail.  Nicos Stavropoulos argues that Dworkin is best understood this way (Stavropoulos 1996).  
Stavropoulos argues that the term “cruel” is a rigid designator of evolving moral standards regarding 
cruelness just as the term “gold” is a rigid designator of substances with atomic number 69.  The claim that 
K-P semantics applies to moral terms is a highly contentious one, but more important, even if 
Stavropoulos’ argument is successful, his claims are beside the point.  K-P semantics is designed to shed 
light upon sentence meaning and semantic content, not utterance interpretation more generally.  Kripke 
himself explicitly recognizes that pragmatic facts are relevant to interpreting specific utterances (Kripke 
1998; Ostertag 1998).  In fact, the point of drawing a distinction between semantics and pragmatics is 
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If Dworkin is employing a distinction between semantics and pragmatics to argue 
that political intentions are irrelevant to interpreting constitutional text, then his argument 
not only rests upon highly contentious ground but also contains a false premise, namely, 
that interpreting a particular text involves merely determining the semantic content of the 
words used in the text.  Dworkin’s argument that political intentions are irrelevant to 
constitutional interpretation fails. 
 
Political Intentions and Pragmatics 
Perhaps recognizing the problems with his way of relying upon a distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics, Dworkin ultimately seems to accept that pragmatic 
facts are relevant to constitutional interpretation.  In particular, Dworkin recognizes that 
“[h]istory is crucial to [constitutional interpretation], because we must know something 
about the circumstances in which a person spoke to have any good idea of what he meant 
to say in speaking as he did” (Dworkin 1996, 8).  So Dworkin at times agrees that when 
we interpret the Constitution we are engaged in utterance interpretation, which requires 
attention to more than semantic content or sentence meaning.  In Grice’s terms, Dworkin 
is now concerned with what the framers meant rather than only with what they said.  Yet 
Dworkin still maintains that “[w]e must take care to make a distinction . . . between what 
someone means to say and what he hopes or expects or believes will be the consequence 
                                                 
typically to keep the various ways in which we use words to communicate from soiling our tidy semantic 
theories.   
As for Dworkin, it is unclear whether he agrees with Stavropoulos’ characterization of his work.  
Elsewhere, Dworkin rejects the notion that there are “political kinds” but nonetheless proceeds as if there 
were political kinds, stating that “in fact there are instructive similarities between natural kinds and political 
concepts” (Dworkin 2004).  However, even this (seemingly) more modest claim requires Dworkin to 
explain the relationship between his method of interpretation and his moral theory.  How do we determine 
whether capital punishment indeed is cruel, as a matter of fact?  For a discussion that casts doubt upon 
whether Dworkin can provide an adequate explanation of this relationship, see Mahoney (2004).  
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for the law of his saying it.”  (Dworkin 1992, 381).  Even if pragmatic facts are relevant 
to utterance interpretation, according to Dworkin, political intentions are not. 
Without employing some formulation of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, 
however, Dworkin cannot maintain that what he calls political intentions are irrelevant to 
constitutional interpretation.  We can understand why this is the case by noticing different 
ways in which language can be used by speakers to refer.  Language can be used to 
designate directly objects a speaker is understood to have in mind or to designate objects 
that satisfy a description even when the speaker is not understood to have the objects in 
mind.  To illustrate these uses, consider the following three examples involving the 
phrase “Smith’s murderer will die.”15  For every example, assume that you and I are in a 
courtroom where Jones is on trial for Smith’s murder. 
First, the prosecutor has just stated that the defendant tested positive for AIDS, 
and I turn to you and say, “Smith’s murderer will die.”  In this context, “Smith’s 
murderer” is used to refer to Jones, whether Jones is convicted of murdering Smith and 
whether Jones, as a matter of fact, killed Smith.  Second, the prosecutor has just stated 
that the physical evidence taken from the scene demonstrates that the person who killed 
Smith has AIDS, and I turn to you and say, “Smith’s murderer will die.”  In this context, 
if Brown, as a matter of fact, killed Smith, then “Smith’s murderer” is used to refer to 
Brown, even if Jones is convicted of murdering Smith.  Third, the prosecutor has just 
stated that the brutal nature of the crime demands that she seek the death penalty, and I 
                                                 
15 My examples are variations on those provided in Donnellan (1966).  While some philosophers, such as 
Saul Kripke, have argued that the referential use of descriptive language Donnellan identifies illustrates a 
pragmatic, not a semantic, phenomenon, these arguments are not relevant to the point made here (Kripke 
1998; Ostertag 1998).  Kripke recognizes that speakers may use descriptive language referentially, and that 
if we want to interpret their utterances correctly, then we do not simply identify the semantic content of the 
words they use (Kripke 1998).  In any event, insofar as Dworkin recognizes that pragmatic facts are 
relevant to utterance interpretation, arguments such as Kripke’s are unavailable to Dworkin.   
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turn to you and say “Smith’s murderer will die.”  In this context, perhaps “Smith’s 
murderer” is used to refer to Jones, but perhaps not.  Even if Brown killed Smith, if a jury 
convicts Jones, then (unfortunately) “Smith’s murderer” is used to refer to Jones.  
However, if the charges against Jones are dropped and Brown is later convicted, then 
“Smith’s murderer” is used to refer to Brown.   
In the first example, “Smith’s murderer” is used simply to refer to a particular 
object that I am understood to have in mind, namely, Jones.16  In the other two cases, 
“Smith’s murderer” is used to refer to whatever satisfies a certain description.  In the 
second case, it is used to refer to whatever satisfies the description whoever, as a matter 
of fact, killed Smith.  In the third case, however, it is used to refer to whatever satisfies a 
different description, something like whoever, as a matter of fact, is convicted for Smith’s 
murder.  The best interpretation of the utterance of “Smith’s murderer will die” in these 
examples differs with differing contexts.17   
With these distinctions in mind, reconsider Dworkin’s boss example.  We are now 
in a position to understand that the boss’s use of the phrase “most qualified applicant” 
could inform the manager differently depending upon further explication of the context in 
which the boss uttered his instruction.  More important, we are now in a position to 
understand why the evidence Scalia cites is not irrelevant to interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment.  
                                                 
16 It is important to note that the distinctions I am making do not return originalism to relying exclusively 
on the subjective intentions of the framers.  What is important is what the framers were reasonably 
understood to have had in mind, not what the framers actually (perhaps secretly) had in mind.  While the 
latter typically informs the former, the fact that they are distinct permits originalists to maintain that it is the 
reasonable understanding of the Constitution at the time of ratification that guides constitutional 
interpretation (Alexander 2004). 
17 It is not just definite descriptions that can be used referentially, but rather almost any descriptive 
language.  In a deed, a description of “36 degrees running north of a creek,” refers to a particular creek, not 
just any creek that one will find somewhere south of the property, perhaps in Peru.  Technical terms also 
can be used the same way.  
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First, the boss could have used the phrase “most qualified applicant” to designate 
directly an object he had in mind, perhaps his son.  Dworkin seems to recognize this 
possibility when he feels the need to insert “(without winking)” into the example.  If we 
picture the boss winking, it removes most doubt that the phrase “most qualified 
applicant” is used simply to refer to the boss’s son.   
However, this is not the only way “most qualified applicant” could be used to 
designate directly the boss’s son.  If a discussion had just occurred in which the manager 
explained that the boss’s son was the most qualified applicant, then the statement to the 
manager to hire the most qualified applicant could (without a wink) inform the manager 
to hire the boss’s son even if a more qualified applicant, in Dworkin’s sense, applied 
thereafter.18  And if just after uttering his instructions the boss tells the hiring manager 
that his son is to use the corner office, then it becomes even less plausible to interpret the 
boss’s instruction as anything other than a direction to hire his son.   
When a speaker’s actions are inconsistent with a possible interpretation of her 
utterance, that interpretation is thereby less plausible.  Thus, Dworkin is mistaken that the 
following evidence is irrelevant to interpreting the Eighth Amendment: (i) the framers 
explicitly provided specific protections for those accused of capital crimes19 just three 
paragraphs before uttering “cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted” and 
(ii) capital punishment was routinely inflicted after ratification.  Ironically, Dworkin 
seems to recognize the relevance of such evidence when discussing how to interpret the 
phrase “using a firearm” in a statute:  “We do not know what Congress actually said, in 
                                                 
18 Dworkin flatly denies this, but without employing a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, it is 
difficult to understand how this could fail to be the proper interpretation of the boss’s instructions in this 
context (Dworkin 1997b). 
19 Specifically, the Fifth Amendment provides protection for anyone accused of “a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime,” which encompassed all felonies at the time. 
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using a phrase, until we have answered the question of what it is reasonable to suppose, 
in all the circumstances including the rest of the statute, it intended to say in speaking as 
it did”20 (Dworkin 1997a, 117).   
Second, even if the phrase “most qualified applicant” was used to refer to 
whatever satisfies a certain description, that description may not be the one Dworkin 
assumes.  Suppose that the new job is to manage a new store, and the boss makes it no 
secret that he believes managers who use an autocratic management style (AMS) tend to 
be the best store managers.  Other things being equal, hiring an applicant who employs 
AMS satisfies the boss’s instruction more than hiring someone who employs, for 
example, an empowerment management style (EMS).  In that context, it is the boss’s 
conception of “qualified,” rather than the concept “qualified” (if there is such a thing), 
that guides the hiring manager in following the boss’s instruction. 
Now assume the hiring manager knows that the boss prefers his store managers to 
employ AMS because a business magazine the boss always trusts has endorsed AMS.  It 
is also clear that while the boss trusts the hiring manager’s judgment of character, he does 
not trust the hiring manager’s independent judgment on which management style is most 
effective in his stores.  After telling his manager to hire the most qualified applicant for 
the new job, the boss dies, and the magazine subsequently retracts its endorsement of 
AMS and instead endorses EMS.  Now fidelity to the boss’s instruction requires the 
hiring manager to give great weight to EMS applicants even though the boss neither 
would have done so nor would have expected the hiring manager to have done so at the 
time he gave his instruction.  
                                                 
20 Elsewhere, when explaining what “textual fidelity” requires, Dworkin recognizes that one “cannot make 
good sense of their behavior unless we assume that they meant to say what people who use the words they 
used would normally mean to say” (Dworkin 1997b, 1253). 
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Background assumptions about what sources of information, or whose judgment, 
speakers consider trustworthy can be relevant to interpreting their utterances.  Thus, 
Dworkin is mistaken that evidence the framers’ intended to embed the moral values of 
the time in the Bill of Rights because they did not want to leave the development of “an 
evolving national morality” to judges is irrelevant to interpreting the Eighth Amendment.  
In response, Dworkin insists on separating the question of who is to interpret the 
Constitution from the question of what is the correct interpretation of the Constitution 
(Dworkin 1997a; 1997b; 1996; 1986).  While these two questions are conceptually 
distinct, the answer to the former may shed light on the answer to the latter.  Simply 
because it is today generally uncontroversial the Supreme Court is the final, exclusive 
authority on how to interpret the Constitution, if the framers had a greater interpretative 
role for other branches of government or juries in mind, that would be relevant to how to 
interpret the Constitution.  More specifically, if a provision was addressed to, and 
intended to be interpreted by, all branches of government or juries, then the evolving 
moral judgments of different branches or the people themselves could be relevant to 
interpreting the Constitution (Kramer 2004a; 2004b; Whittington 2001; McConnell 
1998). 
Third, Dworkin could be correct that the phrase is used to refer to whatever 
satisfies the description whoever, as a matter of fact, is the most qualified.  If so, then the 
manager must use the best standards for deciding such matters to follow the boss’s 
instruction.  Dworkin assumes that this is the only plausible interpretation.  Indeed, 
Dworkin claims that one “couldn’t deny that [the hiring manager] had been faithful to 
[the boss’s] instructions, and that she would not have been faithful had she deferred to 
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[the boss’s] view about the best candidate instead of her own” (Dworkin 1997b, 1255).  
Yet once Dworkin recognizes that context is “crucial” to utterance interpretation, it is 
difficult to understand how Dworkin could maintain this claim without relying upon 
either some further assumptions about the case or unwarranted assumptions about the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction.  As the context in which the boss uttered his instruction 
changes, the best interpretation of the boss’s utterance changes.  More important, as the 
type of evidence Dworkin calls political intentions changes, the best interpretation of the 
boss’s utterance changes.  Thus, the boss example cannot be used to illustrate the 
irrelevance of political intentions. 
Scalia can agree with Dworkin that, because the framers had certain expectations 
about how the Eighth Amendment should be applied, “it does not follow that they meant 
to say anything different from what you and I would mean to say if we used the same 
words they did” (Dworkin 1996, 76).  This is because Dworkin’s conclusion that political 
intentions are irrelevant to interpreting the Constitution requires that it never follows that 
the framers meant to say anything different from what you and I would mean if we used 
the same words.  As we have seen, however, Dworkin cannot maintain this claim.  The 
context surrounding enactment of the Eighth Amendment, including the type of evidence 
Scalia cites, is relevant to interpreting that particular utterance; and thus, we must look to 
the historical context to determine whether the provision means the same thing were it 
uttered by Dworkin today.21 
                                                 
21 Even if Dworkin were correct, however, it is far from clear what you or I would mean in uttering the 
phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” in ordinary speech.  Most likely, if the phrase were uttered, it 
would be used in a technical, legal way, rather than simply to refer to those punishments that are both cruel 
and rarely administered, which seems to be what Dworkin assumes.  The most natural understanding of 
(what ordinary English speakers would mean by) the utterance, “cruel and unusual punishments shall not 
be inflicted,” is that they are employing technical, legal jargon, which requires inquiry into how the phrase 
is understood in legal contexts.  Using this to guide legal interpretation, however, leads us in a circle.  
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When we interpret the Constitution we are interpreting particular utterances of 
words.  For this reason, we are not merely seeking what Dworkin sometimes calls the 
“natural semantic meaning” of those words (Dworkin 1997a, 124).  Rather, pragmatic 
facts are relevant to utterance interpretation.  Yet once we understand the different ways 
in which the best interpretation of a particular utterance can vary as context varies, we 
can see that the evidence Scalia cites, what Dworkin calls political intentions, is highly 
relevant to constitutional interpretation generally, and interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
specifically.  Dworkin’s distinction between semantic intentions and political intentions, 
as well as his distinction between semantic originalism and expectation originalism, does 
little to clarify the task of interpreting the Constitution.  
 
Interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
For the same reason the best interpretations of the utterances of “Smith’s 
murderer” and “most qualified applicant” change as the context changes, the context 
surrounding the utterance of “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth Amendment 
could dictate that we interpret the provision differently than we would if we were to utter 
the words today.  We must attend to the history surrounding enactment of the provision 
before we can interpret it properly.  As Dworkin elsewhere recognizes:  “History is 
crucial to [constitutional interpretation], because we must know something about the 
circumstances in which a person spoke to have any good idea of what he meant to say in 
speaking as he did” (Dworkin 1996, 8).  Let’s consider a few possibilities. 
                                                 
Therefore, even if Dworkin were correct that the evidence Scalia cites is irrelevant to constitutional 
interpretation, Dworkin’s interpretation of the provision does not readily follow. 
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First, perhaps there was a list of punishments the British Crown had inflicted that 
concerned the framers, and the Eighth Amendment was designed simply to ensure that 
those punishment were not inflicted by the new national government.22  If so, then as 
long as capital punishment was not on the list, the Eighth Amendment should not be 
interpreted to prohibit capital punishment.  
Second, perhaps the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” was a technical 
term, used to refer to punishments considered cruel at the time and unusual in the sense 
that they were not recognized as legitimate punishments under the common law or any 
statute.23  On this interpretation, judges simply are prevented from creating a cruel 
punishment on their own, which seems to be Scalia’s concern with merging judging and 
legislating.  The protections under the Eighth Amendment, then, would be protections 
from judges, not protections from elected officials or juries. 
Third, perhaps the terms “cruel” and “unusual” were understood to work together 
such that the punishments prohibited by the Eighth Amendment evolve as the number of 
states inflicting certain punishments dwindles, as long as the states cease inflicting these 
punishments because they come to view them as inappropriately cruel.  The Supreme 
Court seemed to adopt this interpretation in 1976,24 and perhaps thought that by today so 
few states would inflict capital punishment that it would be sufficiently unusual because 
it was thought too cruel, not according to the ethical standards employed by individual 
judges, but according to the political judgments by citizens’ representatives in the states.  
                                                 
22 In fact, while not dispositive, it does seem clear that the words of the Eighth Amendment were virtually 
copied from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, which was enacted in “response to sentencing 
abuses of the King’s Bench.”  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); but 
see Granucci (1969). 
23 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965-85 (1991) (tracing the history of the prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment in the English Declaration of Rights).  For an influential and revealing discussion of 
how the Eighth Amendment was originally understood, see Granucci (1969). 
24 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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In this way, the provision would not be static, but it also would not be dependent upon 
the moral judgment of individual judges.  
Fourth, perhaps the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” was understood to 
refer to whatever satisfies the description whatever, as a matter of fact, is cruel.  If so, 
then capital punishment is prohibited if it qualifies as cruel according to what we 
currently take to be the correct moral standards for deciding such matters (whatever those 
are).  This is how Dworkin interprets the phrase.  Notice, however, that this interpretation 
is the least plausible on its face because it leaves unexplained why the words “and 
unusual” were included in the provision.  Even if we ignore the words “and unusual,” 
however, Dworkin’s interpretation does not directly follow.  
Perhaps the phrase was understood to refer to whatever satisfied a different 
description, such as whatever qualifies as cruel according to the moral standards at the 
time.  In other words, perhaps the framers are best understood as embedding a certain 
conception of “cruel,” rather than the concept of “cruel,” in the Eighth Amendment, just 
as the boss is best understood as embedding a certain conception of “qualified” in his 
instruction by making it understood that he trusted the magazine’s endorsement of 
management styles.  While it is possible that moral standards generally accepted by the 
framers suggest capital punishment is cruel, it is also possible that these moral standards 
suggest otherwise.  Notice that this understanding of the provision does not directly rely 
upon the expectations of the framers regarding individual cases:  Even if they did not 
expect capital punishment to be prohibited when the Eighth Amendment was enacted, 
capital punishment may nonetheless qualify as “cruel” according to the moral standards 
at the time.   
28 
 
Dworkin rejects interpreting the provision as expressing the moral values at the 
time for the following reason:  “Enlightenment statesmen were very unlikely to think that 
their own views represented the last word in moral progress [and, if they had,] . . . they 
would have made plain that they intended to create a dated provision” (Dworkin 1997a, 
124).  Notice that Dworkin’s claim presupposes that the framers’ opinions regarding 
moral progress are relevant to interpreting the Eighth Amendment, something Dworkin 
denies when Scalia cites the framers’ intent to embed the moral views at the time in the 
provision.  And consider how easily Scalia could respond to Dworkin’s rhetorical claim:  
Enlightenment statesmen created a dated provision because they were wary of how future 
interpretations could take rights away, and if they had wanted to do otherwise, they 
would have made plain that they intended to create a changing provision.25  Before we 
examine more fully the historical context in which the Eighth Amendment was enacted, 
Scalia is just as likely correct that the framers understood the provision to be dated 
because, as Scalia puts it, “otherwise [there] would be no protection against the moral 
perceptions of a future, more brutal, generation” (Scalia 1997, 145). 
So how do we decide among these possible interpretations of the Eighth 
Amendment?  We first need to know the pragmatic facts relevant to interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment, that is, whether “cruel and unusual punishments” was used as a 
                                                 
25 Michael Moore provides an equally unpersuasive account of the historical context in which the 
Constitution was drafted as supporting his favored interpretation.  Moore merely asserts that “[s]uch 
believers in natural rights as Hamilton and Madison took themselves to be referring to entities (natural 
rights) that had a nature independent of theirs or anyone else’s thoughts about it[,]” and then concludes 
from this assertion that, “[w]hen believers in natural rights used phrases, such as ‘no one shall be subject to 
cruel and unusual punishments’ or no one shall be ‘denied equal protection of the laws,’ their semantic 
intentions were to refer to rights whose nature was to guide meaning” (Moore 2001, 1095).  First, it is 
worth noting that neither Hamilton nor Madison was alive to draft or to ratify the Equal Protection Clause 
in 1868.  Second, and more important, even if they had been, the mere fact that they believed in natural 
rights—in the sense Moore construes them—does not itself demonstrate that they intended to incorporate, 
or their contemporaries understood the Eighth Amendment to incorporate, natural rights. 
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technical term, whether there was other language that was purposefully rejected,26 or 
whether there was a commonly known list of punishments inflicted by the British Crown 
that motivated inclusion of the provision.  To answer these questions, however, we need 
to determine how a reasonable person at the time would have understood the Eighth 
Amendment.  But this just is Scalia’s method for interpreting the Constitution.  For 
Dworkin’s discussion of semantic originalism to support his reading of the Constitution, 
Dworkin first must employ Scalia’s method for interpreting the Constitution.  In this way, 
Dworkin’s position collapses into (or perhaps presupposes) Scalia’s position. 
It is important to note that this does not mean that Scalia always applies his own 
method correctly.  Scalia believes that his method precludes interpreting the provision as 
evolving, which excludes reading the provision to evolve as different punishments 
become unusual due to the changing moral assessments of state governments.  Yet nearly 
all the evidence Scalia cites is consistent with this interpretation:  the development of an 
evolving national morality is not left to judges and the Fifth Amendment’s references to 
capital punishment are not superfluous because capital punishment was not “cruel and 
unusual” at the time.  Nonetheless, Scalia’s method of interpreting constitutional texts 
should be the starting point for anyone concerned with fidelity to the Constitution.  
Dworkin’s use of arguments and conclusions from philosophy of language sheds no light 
upon how to interpret constitutional text.   
 
                                                 
26 It is worth noting that while the language in the Eighth Amendment is virtually identical to that in the 
English Declaration of Rights, it differed from the language used in all but one state constitution in 1791:  
Five states prohibited “cruel or unusual punishments,” see Del. Declaration of Rights, § 16 (1776); Md. 
Declaration of Rights, § XXII (1776); Mass. Declaration of Rights, Art. XXVI (1780); N. C. Declaration of 
Rights, § X (1776); N. H. Bill of Rights, Art. XXXIII (1784), and two others prohibited “cruel” 
punishments, see Pa. Const., Art. IX, § 13 (1790); S. C. Const., Art. IX, § 4 (1790), while one prohibited 
“cruel and unusual punishments,” see Va. Declaration of Rights, § 9 (1776). 
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The Dworkin of Conversation 
Dworkin’s more recent work recognizes that interpreting constitutional text is 
much like interpreting speech in conversation:  “constitutional interpretation must begin 
in what the framers said, and, just as our judgment about what friends and strangers say 
relies on specific information about them and the context in which they speak, so does 
our understanding of what the framers said” (Dworkin 1996, 10).  Elsewhere, “When we 
are trying to decide what someone meant to say . . . we are deciding which clarifying 
translation of his inscriptions is the best,” which is done by weaving “assumptions about 
what the speaker believes and wants, and about what it would be rational for him to 
believe and want, into decisions about what he meant to say” (Dworkin 1997a, 117).  
While the task of interpreting legal texts can be complex, it is not different in kind from 
what we do everyday when we interpret “what friends and strangers say.” 
The method of interpreting legal texts in Dworkin’s recent work is what Dworkin 
called “conversational interpretation” in Law’s Empire:  “Conversational interpretation 
. . . assigns meaning in light of the motives and purposes and concerns it supposes the 
speaker to have, and it reports its conclusions as statements about his ‘intention’ in saying 
what he did” (Dworkin 1986, 50).  In Law’s Empire, Dworkin rejected conversational 
interpretation in favor of what he called constructive interpretation:  “constructive 
interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of 
it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong” (Dworkin 
1986, 52). 
Let’s call the early Dworkin who advocated constructive interpretation the 
Dworkin of Construction and the more recent Dworkin who employs conversational 
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interpretation the Dworkin of Conversation.  At first glance, the shift in Dworkin’s 
position seems surprising:  the Dworkin of Conversation employs the very method of 
constitutional interpretation rejected by the Dworkin of Construction.  However, a closer 
look reveals why, in Dworkin’s view anyway, the Dworkin of Conversation and the 
Dworkin of Construction ultimately are advancing compatible methods of interpretation. 
Recall that the Dworkin of Conversation assumes his distinction between 
semantic intentions and political intentions entitles him to conclude that certain historical 
evidence (such as that cited by Scalia) cannot be used to show that the framers meant 
anything other than what you and I would mean in uttering the words in the Constitution.  
From this, the Dworkin of Conversation concludes that the framers “must be understood 
in the way their language most naturally suggests:  they refer to abstract moral principles 
and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government’s power” (Dworkin 1996, 7). 
If the Dworkin of Conversation were correct about the importance of his 
distinction between semantic intentions and political intentions, then employing 
conversational interpretation would lead to the same moral reading of the Constitution as 
constructive interpretation.  For the Dworkin of Conversation, what we would mean in 
uttering, for example, “equal protection of the laws,” likely would be whatever kind of 
legal equality is morally best, assuming we have had a moral education similar to that of 
Dworkin.  Similarly, for the Dworkin of Construction, judges should interpret “equal 
protection of the laws” to embody the best vision of legal equality.  In this way, 
Dworkin’s methodological “shift” is not surprising:  The Dworkin of Conversation 
ultimately advocates the same moral reading of the Constitution as does the Dworkin of 
Construction.   
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Had the Dworkin of Conversation been successful, he would have enjoyed an 
advantage over the Dworkin of Construction.  By focusing upon the text itself, the 
Dworkin of Conversation has stripped more traditional originalists of the following 
rhetorical claim:  Originalists like Scalia merely interpret text, which is politically 
neutral, while the Dworkin of Construction disregards text in favor of judges “imposing 
purpose,” which permits the moral or political views of judges to rule (Dworkin 1996, 
52).27  Thus, the Dworkin of Conversation not only advocates the same moral reading of 
the Constitution as the Dworkin of Construction, but also grounds his moral reading in 
politically neutral textual interpretation. 
As we have seen, however, the Dworkin of Conversation fails on both fronts 
because he misunderstands the import of his distinction between semantic intentions and 
political intentions.  When we clear up that misunderstanding, we can see that 
conversational interpretation may not lead to Dworkin’s moral reading of the 
Constitution.28  Thus, the Dworkin of Conversation faces a choice:  (i) abandon his moral 
reading of the Constitution and retain his politically neutral method of interpretation or 
(ii) abandon conversational interpretation and “shift” back to constructive interpretation 
                                                 
27 Dworkin does not consider judges’ engaging in constructive interpretation to be “legislating from the 
bench.”  Dworkin believes he deflects this charge by distinguishing “fit” from “political justification.”  
Unlike legislators, judges are constrained by considerations of “fit” because, according to Dworkin, judges 
“may not read the abstract moral clauses as expressing any particular moral judgment, no matter how much 
that judgment appeals to them, unless they find it consistent in principle with the structural design of the 
Constitution as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation of other 
judges” (Dworkin 1996, 10).  As Michael McConnell has pointed out, however, Dworkin provides no 
principled way to decide when fidelity to “text, history, tradition, and precedent” is proper and when judges 
should “exercise their moral-philosophical faculties” to make “the Constitution ‘the best it can be’” 
(McConnell 1997, 1270).  In other words, the historical constraint Dworkin gestures at is no constraint at 
all in practice because judges, without principle or text to guide them, decide when to give weight to 
history and when to ignore it.  In the end, there is little difference between legislators and judges for the 
Dworkin of Construction. 
28 I say “may not” because I have not yet shown that when the historical context in which the Constitution 
was written is examined it does not inform us that we should consider our current moral views when 




to retain his moral reading of the Constitution.29  Dworkin can no longer have his 
politically neutral cake and eat it too. 
Whether the Dworkin of Conversation abandons fidelity to text, we can see why 
the starting place for those concerned with fidelity should be to determine how 
constitutional text was originally understood; and what Dworkin calls political intentions 
are relevant to this task.  Thus, far from relying upon irrelevant information when 
interpreting the Constitution and misunderstanding important philosophical distinctions, 
Scalia gets it exactly right.  Scalia’s originalist method should be the starting point for 
anyone concerned with fidelity to constitutional text. 
In Chapter 2, we will see how Dworkin’s focus on concepts instead of 
conceptions is unhelpful in interpreting constitutional text, even as a practical matter.   
                                                 
29 Evidence that Dworkin would not abandon his moral reading when it conflicts with fidelity is that the 
Dworkin of Conversation still characterizes his method of interpretation as constructive interpretation 
(Dworkin 1997b).  Dworkin thinks this characterization is correct, in part, because he does not accept that 
there is a politically or morally neutral way to interpret legal texts (Dworkin 2004).  As Ram Neta recently 
argued, this claim is dubious (Neta 2004).  While this is not the place for a full discussion of the issue, it is 
worth noting that Dworkin’s most recent argument in support of this claim fails.   
Dworkin argues that that a certain type of positivist, such as Scalia, must take sides in legal 
disputes because his position entails that certain arguments legal disputants employ are legally irrelevant.  
For example, according to Dworkin, if Party A wants a court to disregard a statute because it would be 
unfair to apply it in her case, then because Scalia’s position would entail that her opponent, Party B, should 
win under the law, Scalia is taking sides, and thus, is not remaining neutral (Dworkin 2004).  However, 
such examples do not show that positivism, or at least the version adopted by Scalia, lacks neutrality, not in 
the relevant sense anyway.  If the content of the statute were exactly the opposite, then Party B would be 
arguing that the law is unfair, and in that case Scalia would rule against Party B.  Consider Scalia’s dissent 
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2002), in which 
Scalia recognized that a substantive due process right cannot be created to protect corporations from 
punitive damage awards any more than one can be created to ensure a woman’s right to choose to have an 
abortion.  The only “side” Scalia is taking is the side of those who were properly authorized to enact the 
relevant law in the first place.  Opting out of a moral debate may have moral implications, but it does not 
necessarily amount to taking sides in the moral debate, any more than opting out of a scientific debate 
amounts to taking sides on contentious scientific issues.  The fact that parties make certain moral 
arguments, which at times are accepted by judges, does not show positivism is incomplete any more than 
the fact that certain “intelligent design” arguments at times are accepted by scientists shows that science 







FINDING RELIGION FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Introduction 
Scholars and courts have struggled to come up with a definition of the term 
“religion” for the religion clauses, which provide, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”31  They 
have done this because they believe that finding a definition will help to provide a 
uniform test for whether something qualifies for protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause or raises concerns under the Establishment Clause (Agneshwar 1992; Beckwirth 
2003; Choper 1982; Donovan 1995; Echols 2003; Greenawalt 1984; House 1999; Mason 
1988; Penalver 1997).  That aspiration is misguided:  providing a single definition of the 
term “religion” will not help to apply the religion clauses.  Their focus has been primarily 
upon whether the religion clauses require a broad or a narrow definition of the term 
“religion,” whereas, as I will argue, their focus should be upon when the religion clauses 
require a broad definition and when they require a narrow definition.  Finding the proper 
focus helps to dissolve some longstanding problems regarding the religion clauses—the 
                                                 
30 Reprinted with kind permission of The John Marshall Law Review.   
31 U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
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so-called “tension between the clauses” and the lack of a definition of the term “religion” 
for religion clause jurisprudence. 
As many scholars have noted, finding a single definition of the term “religion” 
that works in both religion clauses is extremely difficult.  Some scholars claim that the 
framers used “religion” to refer only to theistic belief systems (Freeman 1983; Penalver 
1997; Strang 2002).  This definition, however, would lead to legally absurd results.  For 
instance, Hinduism would qualify for full protection under the Free Exercise Clause 
while Buddhism, or at least Zen Buddhism, would receive none (Taliaferro 1998; LaFleur 
1988).  Courts have recognized the need to protect nontheistic belief systems such as 
“Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism” under the Free Exercise 
Clause.32  Occasionally, courts even consider conscientious objections to war, whether 
based in theistic beliefs or not, to qualify as religious.33  A legally acceptable 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, therefore, must include nontheistic belief 
systems. 
A more expansive definition of the term “religion,” however, creates practical 
problems in interpreting the Establishment Clause.  For example, if a deeply held, but 
nontheistic, moral objection to war could qualify for protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause, then arguably, the moral theory that generates the objection cannot be taught in 
public schools without violating the Establishment Clause.  Yet such a result is legally 
unacceptable.   
                                                 
32 Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495, n.11 (1961). 
33 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (interpreting a federal statute that exempted religious 
conscientious objectors from the draft to include those with “deeply held moral, ethical, or religious 
beliefs” against war).  
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To avoid this kind of result, some scholars have proposed that the term “religion” 
be defined differently in each clause (Tribe 1978).  This, however, is an attempt to reach 
the desired legal result by ignoring the text of the Constitution.  The word “religion” only 
occurs once in the two clauses:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”34  Thus, it seems implausible that the 
definition of the term “religion” varies between the two clauses.35   
Nonetheless, the Free Exercise Clause seems to require a more expansive 
definition than the Establishment Clause.  Thus, providing a definition of “religion” that 
works in both clauses is difficult.  But there is another problem:  there simply is no 
single, correct definition of the term “religion” as it occurs in ordinary English.  These 
problems have led some scholars to conclude that the religion clauses present a unique 
challenge for courts.  For instance, one scholar claims that “the inability of the court to 
provide an adequate definition of religion in the First Amendment has given rise to a 
number of inconsistent and contradictory decisions” (House 1999, 257). 
While there have been “inconsistent and contradictory decisions,” their primary 
cause is not the courts’ inability to provide a definition of the term “religion.”  To the 
extent the lack of a definition hinders consistent interpretations of the religion clauses, it 
creates no greater problem for those clauses than for others.  Such terms as “life,” 
“executive,” and “press” present nearly identical definitional challenges for constitutional 
interpretation.  The lack of a precise definition of the term “religion” in the religion 
clauses presents no greater interpretative challenge than does the lack of precise 
                                                 
34 U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
35 That is, if indeed there are two clauses.  Stephen Carter has argued that the better approach is to 
recognize only one clause (Carter 2002).  Nothing here is inconsistent with this approach. 
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definitions for terms in other clauses.  In other words, despite the definitional challenges, 
there is nothing constitutionally special about the term “religion.” 
Yet there is something quite special about religion.  A religion can play many 
roles in a person’s life.  A religion can be “an institution . . . an ideology or worldview 
. . . a set of personal loyalties . . . locus of community, akin to family ties . . . an aspect of 
identity,” and it can provide “answers to questions of ultimate reality, and offer[] a 
connection to the transcendent” (McConnell 2000, 42)  These different aspects of 
religions are important in different legal contexts, or so I will argue.  For instance, if 
courts exempt religious conscientious objectors from military service, they are treating 
religion as a set of personal loyalties, an ideology, and an aspect of identity.36  This 
explains why we are also tempted to exempt atheistic conscientious objectors:  their 
conscientious objections similarly involve a set of personal loyalties, their ideologies, and 
aspects of their identities.  In contrast, if courts exempt religions from antidiscrimination 
laws, they are treating religion as a private institution formed to exhibit and embody a 
worldview.  The autonomy of the religion itself is violated if, e.g., the Catholic church 
must ordain and “hire” female priests. 
Because different aspects of religions are relevant in different legal contexts, what 
qualifies for protection under the Free Exercise Clause or raises concerns under the 
Establishment Clause depends upon the legal context.  In other words, even if there were 
a uniquely correct definition of the term “religion” as it occurs in ordinary English, it 
should not fix the definition in the religion clauses because what qualifies as a religion 
should, indeed must, differ across differing legal contexts.  Thus, not only should we not 
                                                 
36 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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expect a single definition of “religion” but, for legal purposes, we also should not desire 
one. 
Providing a single definition for the religion clauses would create more problems 
than it would solve.  This is not to suggest that two definitions, one for each clause, 
would resolve the problems.  The single occurrence of the term “religion” in the religion 
clauses makes such an interpretation implausible.  More important, however, a single 
definition for each clause still ignores the relationship between the legal context and what 
qualifies as a religion in that context.  Properly understanding this relationship has at least 
two benefits:  (i) we will cease the futile search for a single “correct” definition of the 
term “religion” for the religion clauses and (ii) we will obtain a greater understanding of 
what is required to reduce whatever tension exists between the two clauses.  Perhaps 
more important, however, we will be in a better position to diagnose the “inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions.” 
The argument advances in three stages.  The first stage outlines the different 
approaches scholars and courts have used to provide a definition of the term “religion” in 
the religion clauses and exposes problems with each approach.  The second stage shows 
that even if we could produce an acceptable, single definition of the term “religion,” it 
would not help in interpreting and applying the religion clauses because what qualifies as 
religion differs across differing legal contexts.  Third, I will illustrate how recognizing 
the contextual nature of what qualifies as a religion places us in a better position to 
diagnose and reduce whatever tension exists between the clauses.  In the end, the 
interpretation of the religion clauses that emerges from this recognition is that the religion 
39 
 
clauses are best understood as extensions of neighboring clauses⎯Free Speech, Equal 
Protection, etc.⎯into the religious context.37   
 
The Futile Search for a Single Definition of “Religion” 
Before examining different proposed definitions of the term “religion,” we must 
first determine what it is we want from an adequate definition for the religion clauses.  
The practical motivation of those attempting to provide a definition of “religion” is to 
help courts avoid inconsistent and contradictory decisions (House 1999; Donovan 1995; 
Niles 2003).  To do so, a definition must satisfy at least two minimal criteria.  First, it 
must assist courts in deciding difficult cases.  Otherwise, it cannot help to eliminate the 
problems the lack of an adequate definition supposedly creates.  Second, a definition 
cannot produce clearly counterintuitive legal results:  it must be neither too broad nor too 
narrow.  Some deviation from our basic intuitions about what the religion clauses protect 
or forbid is tolerable (and perhaps expected), but gross deviations are a sign that the 
definition simply trades inconsistency for counterintuitive results. 
In general, courts and scholars employ three approaches to providing a definition 
of the term “religion” for the religion clauses.  First, some scholars provide definitions by 
trying to figure out how the framers used the term “religion.”  I will call this the 
“originalist approach,” even though, for reasons I will provide, what is characterized as 
the “originalist approach” does not reflect the more recent discussions of originalism 
referenced in the first chapter of this dissertation.  Second, some scholars attempt to 
identify something unique to religions and appeal to that unique trait to define “religion.”  
                                                 
37 This is not to say, however, that the religion clauses are superfluous.  As Mark Tushnet points out, any 
protection afforded to religious expression under the Free Exercise Clause is also afforded under the Free 
Speech Clause (Tushnet 2001).  
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I will call this the “uniqueness approach.”  Third, some scholars, and many courts, 
identify religions by asking whether something is sufficiently similar to things that are 
widely accepted as clear examples of religions.  I will call this the “analogical 
approach.”38 
 
The Originalist Approach 
Originalists look to how the framers used the language in the Constitution, or how 
that language was originally understood, as a method of discerning its meaning.  
Specifically, they look to how the framers used the term “religion” in order to identify its 
meaning in the religion clauses.  There seems to be general agreement about what the 
framers meant when they used the term “religion” in the First Amendment (Freeman 
1983; Penalver 1997; Strang 2002).39  As George Freeman argues, the framers referred to 
a creator, deity, or maker whenever they used the term “religion” (Freeman 1983).  From 
this, Freeman concludes that the framers “equated religion with theism” (Freeman 1983, 
1520).  Many scholars are persuaded that for an originalist, theism is “a constitutionally 
necessary ingredient to qualify a belief system as a religion” (Donovan 1995, 36). 
If this originalist definition were correct, and as I show later it is not, then it is 
unacceptably narrow and thereby fails to satisfy the second criterion of adequacy for a 
definition.  For instance, Zen Buddhism and Taoism would not be religions under such a 
definition (LaFleur 1988; Taliaferro 1998).  When we insert the definition into the 
religion clauses, the results are legally unacceptable.  For example, the Free Exercise 
Clause would not protect Zen Buddhism and Taoism, nor would the Establishment 
                                                 
38 The futility of some of these approaches may seem obvious.  I discuss them because, as noted 
throughout, scholars and courts continue to employ them. 
39 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1979). 
41 
 
Clause prohibit governments from requiring citizens to practice them.40  Even if a purely 
theistic definition may have been legally adequate in 1791 given the lack of religious 
diversity and the applicability of the First Amendment only to the Federal Government, it 
is no longer legally adequate.  Consequently, this definition fails to satisfy the second 
criterion of adequacy for a definition. 
It is worth pausing to note, however, that for reasons discussed in Chapter 1, 
originalism is not committed to the theistic definition traditionally attributed to it.  The 
recent shift in focus for many originalists from the subjective intent of the framers to the 
original understanding of the text makes the fact that the framers only had theistic 
religions in mind less than decisive when interpreting the scope of the religion clauses.  
The historical context is very likely to reveal that the framers understood “religion” to 
concern worship and teaching more than views about a certain deity.   
 
The Uniqueness Approach 
Other scholars define the term “religion” by attempting to identify traits that all 
religions share and that only religions possess.  If such traits exist, then perhaps they can 
be used to define the term “religion” for the religion clauses.  We can divide attempts to 
identify something unique to religion by the type of unique trait sought:  (i) a unique set 
of concepts of which the content of the term “religion” is composed, (ii) a unique kind of 
input that produces religious beliefs, and (iii) a unique kind of output that religious 
beliefs produce.  I will call these three different methods the “content-based method,” the 
“epistemological method,” and the “functional method,” respectively. 
                                                 
40 Even if there are other constitutional reasons why government could not require such conduct, it 
nonetheless would be legally absurd if violation of the Establishment Clause were not among them. 
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The Content-Based Method 
Those employing the content-based method attempt to specify the simple 
concepts out of which the complex content of the term “religion” is composed.  This is a 
familiar way in which we try to define terms.  For instance, we define the term 
“bachelor” by decomposing it into the simple concepts of which its content is composed, 
namely “male,” “unmarried,” and “adult.”  With the simple concepts identified, we can 
determine which things are bachelors; in this case, the unmarried male adults.  If we 
identify the simple concepts that compose the content of the term “religion,” then we 
similarly may be able to determine which things are religions. 
Using the content-based method, Anand Agneshwar defines religion as “a system 
of beliefs, based on supernatural assumptions, that posits the existence of apparent evil, 
suffering, or ignorance in the world and announces a means of salvation or redemption 
from those conditions” (Agneshwar 1992, 295).  For Agneshwar, there must be 
supernatural content, among other things, for any purported religion to qualify as such.  
Agneshwar’s definition fails.  Not all religions employ the supernatural.  For 
example, pantheists, some Unitarians, and Taoists do not (Peterson 1991).  Yet they all 
should qualify for protection under the Free Exercise Clause and raise concerns under the 
Establishment Clause.  If a set of concepts does not apply to some religions, then that set 
cannot comprise the simple concepts out of which the content of the term “religion” is 
composed.  Because some religions fail to employ the supernatural, Agneshwar’s 
definition fails.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s often-cited discussion of the term “game” illustrates the 
general problem with the content-based method (Witttgenstein 1958, ¶66).  Wittgenstein 
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points out that there is no single way to decompose the content of the term “game” into 
simple constituents.  Hockey, backgammon, throwing a ball against a wall, and solitaire 
are all games.  But what do they have in common?  There is no set of simple concepts 
that applies to all games, such as “board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-
games,” etc. (Witttgenstein 1958, ¶66).  Because the things that qualify as games are so 
diverse, there is no single decomposition of the term “game” into simple constituents.   
The same is true for the term “religion.”  Zen Buddhists do not believe in a deity, 
some early religions lack awe and reverence, and Mormons do not believe in the 
transcendent (Taliaferro 1998).  Also, while something as broad as a concern for ultimate 
reality may capture all religions, it also likely captures much of mainstream science and 
philosophy.  Any set of simple concepts that applies to some religions will fail to apply to 
all religions or will apply to nonreligions.  Thus, the content-based method fails to satisfy 
the second criterion of adequacy for a definition because ultimately it produces 
definitions that are too narrow, too broad, or both.41 
 
The Epistemological Method 
Those employing the epistemological method attempt to identify unique inputs for 
religious beliefs.  According to the epistemological method, religious beliefs are arrived 
at in a unique way.  If we can identify a distinctive epistemology of religious beliefs, then 
perhaps we can use it to define the term “religion” for the religion clauses. 
                                                 
41 The following definition provided by Eli Echols incurs similar problems:  Religion is a life system that 
“recognizes what is divine; . . . includes rules governing behavior, traceable to the divine, that do not 
contradict the ‘golden rule;’ and . . . calls on its participants to conform to the rules of the divine” (Echols 
2003, 121).  It is unclear why a religion could not reject the divine or the “golden rule” and yet remain a 
religion.  Perhaps recognizing this, Echols later states that “a life system’s rules proceed from the divine in 
some way that is analogous to those of the major religions,” which seems closer to the analogical approach 
(Echols 2003, 133-34).  Because the analogical approach also fails, it does not matter which approach 
Echols would choose.  
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Craig Mason uses the epistemological method to identify religions as belief 
systems involving ultimate concerns where “ultimate” means something like “all values 
and ‘knowledge’ which cannot be proven true, or even tested, by empirical evidence[, but 
rather] rest upon some type of non-rational ‘faith’” (Mason 1988, 456).  Robert Audi 
relies upon an epistemological distinction to argue that religious arguments should not 
shape public policy (Audi 1993).  Audi distinguishes religious arguments by claiming 
that they do not provide motivation for a “rational and informed person” (Audi 1993, 
677).  Audi then uses this epistemological distinction to conclude that we must “separate 
religion from law and public policy” (Audi 1993, 677). 
Such epistemological distinctions are widely accepted.  For instance, agnostics 
think that belief in a deity is epistemologically different from ordinary beliefs.  Atheists 
also think that there is something epistemologically unique (and suspect) about belief in a 
deity.  Most theists accept that belief in a deity is epistemologically unique as well.  
Wittgenstein is credited with pointing out that if you tell me that God is in the next room, 
and I look in the room and report that God is not there, I have not disproved your claim, 
but rather have shown that I do not understand your claim.   
Even if this is the case, however, there is still a problem with defining the term 
“religion” using an epistemological distinction.  Different religions have different 
conceptions of what makes it the case that one is supposed to hold their beliefs.  For 
instance, what, if anything, justifies the beliefs of Buddhists differs from what, if 
anything, justifies the beliefs of Calvinists (Taliaferro 1998; Peterson 1991).  No single 
epistemological category captures all types of religious beliefs.  Some religions do not 
incorporate a deity, and, more to the point, some religions do not advocate accepting their 
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doctrines on faith (Taliaferro 1998).  Thus, even if one can distinguish some religious 
beliefs epistemologically, one cannot similarly distinguish all religious beliefs because 
religious beliefs are too diverse in their epistemology. 
Even if we ignore some of the diversity of religious beliefs and consider only 
belief in a deity, the epistemological method still fails.  The theological and philosophical 
questions that one must answer to establish that belief in a deity has a distinctive 
epistemology are too contentious for this method to produce an adequate definition.  In 
other words, the question of whether belief in a deity has a distinctive epistemology is at 
least as disputed as the original question of which belief systems are the referents of the 
term “religion.”42 
For some atheists, the fact that some religious beliefs require faith is not enough 
to make them epistemologically distinctive.  For instance, some atheist philosophers 
think that all beliefs are justified (and perhaps true) only relative to a perspective.43  For 
these philosophers, all beliefs—even scientific ones—are ultimately based upon an 
unsupportable assumption.  Unlike some theists who elevate religious beliefs to the 
epistemological status of scientific beliefs, these philosophers demote scientific beliefs to 
the epistemological status of unsupportable religious beliefs.  
But even if we reject these philosophers’ radical theses regarding scientific 
beliefs, it is more difficult to reject a similar claim regarding moral beliefs.  In other 
words, even if scientific beliefs are not ultimately based upon an unsupportable 
                                                 
42 For instance, while an agnostic does not know that a deity exists, she need not take a stand upon whether 
others know that a deity exists or whether others know that a deity exists in the same way as she knows that 
things exist generally.  In other words, while an agnostic lacks evidence of a deity’s existence, she need not 
take a stand upon what kind of evidence she lacks.  Also, some theists, e.g., pantheists, think that we learn 
about a deity the same way that we learn about tables, namely by empirical evidence (Penalver 1997).  
Perhaps this reveals only that people mean different things when they use the term “deity,” but if so, the 
prospects of identifying an epistemological marker for all religious beliefs are even less likely. 
43 There is vast literature on this subject, but one representative is by Richard Rorty (1986). 
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assumption, it seems that nonreligious moral beliefs are.  As Larry Alexander points out, 
neither moral beliefs nor religious beliefs are empirically grounded the same way 
scientific beliefs are (Alexander 1993).  While Alexander’s claim is not universally 
accepted, many philosophers believe that what provides us reason to accept moral beliefs, 
e.g., moral sentiments, is not itself capable of further support (Hume 1978).  If these 
philosophers are correct, then even if we can distinguish scientific beliefs from religious 
beliefs epistemologically, we cannot similarly distinguish moral beliefs and religious 
beliefs.   
At the very least, these complexities reveal that epistemologically distinguishing 
religious beliefs depends upon resolving extremely controversial theological and 
epistemological questions.  Thus, the epistemological distinction that scholars like Audi 
rely upon to conclude that we must “separate religion from law and public policy” is 
itself extremely contentious.  Ironically, the theological and philosophical questions that 
must be resolved to maintain such a distinction are precisely the kind of questions that the 
religion clauses are designed to keep government from resolving. 
What this shows is that an epistemological distinction cannot capture all religious 
beliefs.  Religious beliefs are epistemologically too diverse.  For instance, faith plays 
virtually no role in Zen Buddhism, but an enormous role in most Christian religions 
(Taliaferro 1998; Peterson 1991).  One cannot identify something unique to religions by 
discerning distinctive inputs of religious beliefs.  Thus, the epistemological method fails 
to satisfy the second criterion of adequacy for a definition:  it produces definitions that 
are too narrow, too broad, or simply too contentious. 
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The Functional Method 
Those scholars employing the functional method attempt to identify unique 
outputs of religious beliefs.  According to the functional method, religious beliefs play a 
unique role in the lives of adherents.  For example, James Donovan uses this method to 
identify religions by whether they, roughly, respond “to the existential concerns of the 
individual” by serving “the psychological function of alleviating death anxiety” 
(Donovan 1995, 29, 95).  Another scholar who employs this method is Keith Yandell 
(1999): 
A religion proposes a diagnosis (an account of what it takes 
the basic problem facing human beings to be) and a cure (a 
way of permanently and desirably solving that problem): 
one basic problem shared by every human person and one 
fundamental solution that, however adapted to different 
cultures and cases, is essentially the same across the board. 
(17) 
Those attempting to identify a unique role that religious belief systems play 
encounter problems similar to those that plague the content-based method.  Again, 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the term “game” is informative.  There is no single role that 
games play in our lives.  Even if there were, there would be nongames that also play that 
role.  The same is true of religions.  For instance, why is alleviating death anxiety a 
religious role, whereas, presumably, alleviating stage fright is not?  Religious beliefs can 
play either, or neither, role.  Reading Epicurus provides a set of beliefs that alleviates 
death anxiety, but it is not thereby a religion.  Also, identifying “one basic problem 
shared by every human person and one fundamental solution” is not unique to religions.  
Freudian psychology diagnoses a basic problem facing all humans and then proposes a 
cure, and yet Freudian psychology is no religion.  There is no unique role that religions, 
or games, play in our lives.  The functional method fails to satisfy the second criterion of 
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adequacy for a definition because the definitions it produces are either too narrow or too 
broad. 
None of the three methods has identified a trait that all religions share and only 
religions possess.  There is no single decomposition of the content of the term “religion” 
into simple constituents.  It is too contentious whether (and unlikely that enough) 
religious beliefs are epistemologically distinctive.  No distinctive role has been identified 
that all and only religious belief systems play.  Thus, the uniqueness approach fails to 
provide an adequate definition of the term “religion” for the religion clauses.  If we are 
going to define the term “religion” for the religion clauses, we need to do so in a way that 
does not rely upon the existence of such unique traits. 
 
The Analogical Approach 
Those employing the analogical approach, perhaps recognizing the failure of the 
uniqueness approach, do not attempt to identify traits unique to religions.  Instead, they 
compare a belief system with belief systems from paradigmatic traditional religions to 
determine whether the belief system in question has more in common with religious 
belief systems than with nonreligious ones.  For example, Eduardo Penalver identifies 
religions by comparing belief systems with one theistic religion, one nontheistic religion, 
and one pantheistic religion (Penalver 1997).  Similarly, George Freeman identifies 
something as a religion if it “is more likely to promote a paradigmatic religious belief 
system than a paradigmatic irreligious one” (Freeman 1983, 1563).  Also, courts have 
adopted this “definition by analogy” approach.44 
                                                 




There is an initial problem those employing the analogical approach must address: 
they must identify which similarities are the relevant ones for comparison.  This problem, 
however, does not seem difficult to overcome.  After all, native English speakers seem to 
have no trouble identifying new religions as such.  For instance, native speakers have 
come to identify Mormonism as a religion even though Joseph Smith founded it after the 
term “religion” already had a meaning, and they likely did so because Mormonism 
resembles belief systems accepted as religions in certain ways:  it has a “belief in God; a 
comprehensive view of the world . . . belief in some form of afterlife; communication 
with God . . . the use of sacred texts,” etc. (Greenawalt 1984, 767).  Even though, as we 
have seen, none of these traits are possessed by all and only religions, they are relevant to 
identifying religions; otherwise they never would have been plausible candidates.  Thus, 
it seems that we already make accurate assumptions about which similarities are relevant 
when we compare a belief system with paradigm examples of religions and nonreligions. 
Even after we determine the relevant similarities, however, the analogical 
approach cannot help us when the subject matter requires precision.  To illustrate, 
consider the following example, again involving the term “game.”  Suppose a group of 
schoolchildren race to get their math problems done first whenever they are given an 
assignment.  They do not agree to do this, nor do they receive an explicit reward for 
finishing first.  Is this a game?  Perhaps we would call it a game, and perhaps we would 
(likely unconsciously) analogize with paradigm examples of games to make our decision, 
just as the analogical approach suggests.  Someone might even refer to it as “the 
schoolchildren’s little game.”  But what follows from this?   
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Assume that the school would receive a $100,000 grant if the schoolchildren’s 
attempts to finish first really constitute a game.  Ordinarily it would not matter whether it 
really is a game.  It is enough that it is not wrong to call it a game.  But the fact that it is 
not wrong to call it a game does not entail that it is wrong not to call it a game.  In other 
words, even though someone is not abusing the language by calling it a “game,” someone 
who refuses to call it a “game” also is not abusing the language.  There simply is no clear 
answer in such circumstances.  The fact that someone is not incorrect to call it “the 
schoolchildren’s little game” decides nothing about the funding.   
When we analogize with paradigm examples of games, the most we can conclude 
is that this is a borderline case:  the schoolchildren’s attempts to finish first share relevant 
similarities with some games, but not others.  Thus, contrary to Kent Greenawalt’s hope, 
the analogical approach itself cannot “help us resolve borderline questions and work 
toward clarification of the conditions required for the application of the concept” 
(Greenawalt 1984, 766).  When the situation requires extraordinary precision, the 
analogical approach provides no guidance in resolving borderline cases, even if we could 
identify all of the similarities relevant for comparison. 
It requires precision for us to determine whether something satisfies the definition 
of the term “religion” when interpreting the religion clauses.  After all, native English 
speakers do not seriously disagree about whether Catholicism is a religion.  Instead, 
people disagree about whether borderline cases, e.g., Shintoism, are religions (Noss 1999; 
Markham 1996).  As we ordinarily use the term “religion,” it is not wrong either to call 
Shintoism a religion or to refuse to call it a religion in certain contexts.  The analogical 
approach does not help to determine whether borderline cases such as Shintoism really 
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are religions.  The analogical approach does not lead to counterintuitive results like the 
other approaches we have considered, but it also cannot help to resolve “inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions.”  The analogical approach fails to satisfy the first criterion of 
adequacy for a definition because it cannot assist courts in deciding hard cases. 
At this point, we can conclude that the analogical approach cannot supply the 
requisite precision to decide borderline cases.  However, we also can understand why.  
Where extraordinary precision is needed, the intuitions of native speakers about which 
things particular terms refer to (semantic intuitions) are not helpful.  After all, it is 
differences in our semantic intuitions that make borderline cases borderline in the first 
place.  For example, native speakers’ semantic intuitions are not uniform regarding 
whether the term “religion” properly refers to Shintoism.  It is this same lack of 
uniformity that makes borderline cases difficult for courts.  Our semantic intuitions 
cannot help to resolve difficult cases because they are what make the cases difficult in the 
first place.  Thus, a theory that merely describes or explains our semantic intuitions 
cannot help to resolve difficult religion clause cases.45  The confidence that courts and 
scholars have that the analogical approach can identify religions for interpretation of the 
religion clauses is simply misplaced. 
                                                 
45 It is worth noting that this criticism of the analogical approach does not depend upon adopting a 
traditional theory of meaning and reference whereby terms refer via descriptions native speakers associate 
with them.  An alternative theory of reference, developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, whereby 
terms refer not via descriptions native speakers associate with them but because of facts external to native 
speakers, does not change the result (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975).  While it is plausible (but extremely 
controversial) that natural-kind terms such as “water” and “gold” do not refer to objects that satisfy 
descriptions native speakers associate with the terms—such as “wet” and “liquid” or “hard” and 
“yellowish”—but rather are rigidly designated by facts external to native speakers—such as atomic 
structure—it is not at all clear how terms like “religion” are similarly rigidly designated, despite the efforts 
of some scholars to apply this theory of reference to moral and legal terms (Stavropoulos 1996).  Unlike 
with science (and as we have seen) native English speakers disagree about what “facts” are relevant to 
fixing the referents of the term “religion” as well as about who are the “experts” (analogous to scientists) 
needed to provide the authoritative opinions regarding the proper referents of the term “religion.”  Thus, 
this alternative theory of reference cannot save the analogical approach.   
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None of the three approaches we have examined provides an adequate definition 
of the term “religion” for the religion clauses.  Thus, the Court’s inability to provide a 
definition of the term “religion” in the First Amendment is understandable.  But without 
such a definition, how can we avoid the “inconsistent and contradictory” religion clause 
decisions that many scholars attribute to the lack of such a definition?  In other words, 
while I may have explained why the Court has not provided a definition of the term 
“religion,” I also seem to have explained why religion clause jurisprudence will continue 
to produce “inconsistent and contradictory decisions.”  As I will argue next, however, the 
lack of a single, correct definition of the term “religion” does not doom religion clause 
jurisprudence. 
 
The Religion Clauses Do Not Require a Unique Definition 
The primary cause of “inconsistent and contradictory” religion clause decisions is 
not the fact that there is no uniquely correct definition of the term “religion” as it occurs 
in ordinary English.  If it were, then we should expect many other clauses to suffer from 
the same problem.  For instance, the term “life” in the due process clauses is just as 
imprecise.46  Deciding whether a fetus or a brain-dead patient qualifies as “living” 
requires one to take a stance on contentious moral questions.  Definitions of the term 
“life” suffer from the same imprecision as definitions of the term “religion.” 
The same is true for the term “executive.”47  Whether a particular action taken by 
the EPA is executive or legislative in nature depends upon whether the action is law-
making or law-enforcing.  But where one draws the boundary between the two depends 
                                                 
46 U.S. Const. amends. 5, 14. 
47 U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1. 
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upon one’s political theory.  Definitions of the term “executive” also suffer from the 
same imprecision as definitions of the term “religion.”  
Finally, consider the term “press.”48  Does producing a web page or a community 
newsletter qualify as a press?  The Court has refrained from defining the term “press” 
likely because such a definition would create more difficult cases than it would resolve.  
Whatever definition the Court provides, people would manipulate their activities to 
qualify under the definition; it seems much wiser to focus upon, e.g., content and 
viewpoint.  It would be just as counterproductive for the Court to attempt to provide a 
single definition of the term “religion” as it would be to provide a single definition of the 
term “press.”  The stakes for qualifying as a religion simply are too high.  Not only does 
it seem unlikely that the Court could provide uniquely correct definitions of the terms 
“religion” and “press,” but it also seems imprudent for them to do so. 
The fact that the term “religion” has no uniquely correct definition does not create 
a special problem for the religion clauses.  Thus, there is no reason to think that 
inconsistency in religion clause decisions is primarily due to the lack of an adequate 
definition of the term “religion.”  Yet how can courts properly apply the religion clauses 
without such a definition?  Larry Alexander argues that because “any attempt to draw a 
line between secular and sectarian . . . will be impossible to defend theoretically . . . the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses cannot be applied” (Alexander 1993, 793).  Although 
any line between secular and sectarian seems theoretically indefensible, this does not 
mean that the religion clauses cannot be applied.  If a single definition were needed, then 
perhaps there could be no consistent religion clause jurisprudence.  But, as I will 
                                                 
48 U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
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illustrate, the religion clauses do not, and could not, require a single definition of the term 
“religion” in all legal contexts. 
 
The Contextual Nature of What Qualifies as a Religion 
Even if our semantic intuitions would endorse a single definition of the term 
“religion,” we should not employ such a definition for the religion clauses.  A single 
definition will not work because what qualifies as religion for legal purposes differs 
across differing legal contexts. 
There are many roles that religion plays in people’s lives.  A religion can be “an 
institution . . . an ideology or worldview . . . a set of personal loyalties . . . locus of 
community, akin to family ties . . . an aspect of identity,” and it can provide “answers to 
questions of ultimate reality, and offers a connection to the transcendent” (McConnell 
2000, 42).  These different aspects of religion are (and should be) important in different 
legal contexts.  As the legal context differs, what the term “religion” in the religion 
clauses refers to does not remain constant.  To illustrate, consider the following three 
examples. 
First, in some legal contexts, the legally relevant aspects of religion are religion as 
a set of personal loyalties, an ideology, and a facet of personal identity.  To illustrate, 
consider two cases, United States v. Seeger49 and Welsh v. United States,50 interpreting 
the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which exempted from military service 
anyone who “by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to 
                                                 
49 Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
50 Welsh, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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participation in war in any form.”51  Congress expressly excluded objections based upon 
“political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.”52  
Thus, for the Court to find that Seeger and Welsh qualified for the exemption, it had to 
conclude that the objections of Seeger and Welsh were religious.   
In Welsh, the Court found that for one’s beliefs to qualify as religious, it is enough 
that the beliefs are held “with the strength of more traditional religious convictions.”53  
Similarly in Seeger, the Court proposed the following test to determine whether one 
qualifies for the exemption:  “A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life 
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for 
the exemption.”54  Those who “admittedly qualify” do so by having a religiously 
informed conscience, which focuses upon religion as a set of personal loyalties, an 
ideology, and a facet of personal identity.   
The institutional aspect of religions is not directly relevant to what qualifies as 
religion in this context.  Recognizing this, the Court exempted Welsh and Seeger even 
though Seeger was likely an agnostic and Welsh’s beliefs were only “religious in the 
ethical sense of the word,” whatever that means.55  The Court recognized that the 
objections of Welsh and Seeger similarly implicated a set of personal loyalties, an 
ideology, and a facet of personal identity.  Whether these cases ultimately were decided 
correctly, we can see that the fact that one’s religion is organized, a locus of community, 
                                                 
51 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164.  Even though the Court is interpreting a statute in these cases, scholars and other 
courts generally agree that the Court’s discussion is relevant to the constitutional definition of the term 
“religion.”  See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that “[a]s a matter of logic 
and language, if the Court is willing to read ‘religious belief’ so as to comprehend beliefs based upon 
pantheistic and ethical views, it might be presumed to favor a similar inclusive definition of ‘religion’ as 
that term appears in the first amendment”). 
52 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
53 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. 
54 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. 
55 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341. 
56 
 
or practiced by large segments of the population is not directly relevant to whether one’s 
objection qualifies as religious in this context. 
Second, in some legal contexts, the legally relevant aspects of religion are religion 
as an institution exhibiting and embodying a certain worldview.  To illustrate, consider a 
case where a government regulation threatens religious institutional autonomy, e.g., a 
new law applies existing antidiscrimination laws to religions such that the Catholic 
Church is required to ordain and ‘hire’ female priests.  What aspects of religion would be 
relevant when challenging such a law?  If enforced, such a law would threaten the 
institutional integrity of certain religions.  Thus, a religion must at least be organized to 
qualify for protection in this context.  Businesses owned by Seeger and Welsh, no matter 
how deeply they held their views, would not be exempt from such a law on religious 
grounds.  Even with these first two brief examples, we can see that what qualifies as 
religion differs in differing legal contexts. 
Third, in some legal contexts, the legally relevant aspects are all of those relevant 
in the first two contexts.  To illustrate, consider the priest-penitent privilege.  In 1843, a 
court held that the privilege must be recognized on grounds very similar to those relevant 
in the conscientious objector context:  to fail to recognize the privilege would force a 
priest to violate either an ecclesiastical oath or a judicial oath. 56  The court reasoned that 
to avoid forcing a priest to choose between perjury and contempt, the law must exempt 
the priest from ever having to appear.57  Religion was even described as a deeply personal 
“affair between God and man.”58   
                                                 





Yet the court also stated that in this context it “is essential to the free exercise of a 
religion, that its ordinances should be administered – that its ceremonies as well as its 
essentials should be protected.”59  The practices of the religion as an organization, along 
with the expectations of its members regarding its religious practices, are important in 
this context.  The institutional autonomy of the organization is at issue, just as it was in 
the context involving exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.  In the priest-penitent 
context, all of the aspects of religion that were relevant in the first two examples are 
relevant.  Thus, because more must be shown before an entity can qualify for protection 
in the priest-penitent context, fewer entities should qualify in this context than in either of 
the first two legal contexts. 
However such cases should be decided, we can see that the same definition of the 
term “religion” will not work in all three legal contexts because what qualifies as religion 
varies as the legal context varies.  As a result, even if there were a single definition of the 
term “religion” as it occurs in ordinary English, it would not help us interpret and apply 
the religion clauses.  Thus, it cannot be the lack of an adequate definition of the term 
“religion” that explains “inconsistent and contradictory” religion clause decisions. 
One may object that I have confused two different things:  (i) determining what 
qualifies as religion in any given legal context and (ii) defining the term “religion.”  After 
all, the correct definition simply could be very broad in all contexts, and yet not all things 
that are religions would qualify in all legal contexts.  For example, political speech does 
not cease to be speech just because it is not protected from government censure in certain 
forums.  If I want to criticize the government on a public street corner, the Free Speech 
Clause generally prohibits government from silencing me, but if I want to criticize the 




government on a military base, the Free Speech Clause is less likely to prohibit the 
government from silencing me.60  If my speech is not protected from government censure 
in the second context, it is not because my criticisms cease to be speech.  In both cases, 
my criticisms qualify as speech, but yet what qualifies for protection varies as the legal 
context varies.  Perhaps similarly there is a single definition of the term “religion,” but 
what qualifies for protection under the Free Exercise Clause or raises concerns under the 
Establishment Clause is what should vary with the legal context.   
This objection makes an important point that illustrates the limited usefulness of 
concepts and definitions in constitutional interpretation as well as a dilemma for those 
who claim that an adequate definition of the term “religion” will resolve “inconsistent 
and contradictory decisions.”  Either the definition of the term “religion” must 
incorporate the legal context or it cannot help us to determine what qualifies as religion in 
the religion clauses because it is too broad.  Either way, a definition of the term “religion” 
as it occurs in ordinary English will not help us to interpret and apply the religion clauses.  
Thus, it was a mistake for so many legal scholars to believe that providing a definition of 
the term “religion” could help resolve the “inconsistent and contradictory decisions” in 
the first place.  The legal context matters, and, as I will argue next, recognizing how it 
matters helps to dissolve a certain interpretative puzzle involving the religion clauses.  
 
The Tension Between the Clauses 
Recognizing that what qualifies as religion in the religion clauses varies with the 
legal context sheds new light upon the so-called “tension between the clauses.”  To 
illustrate, consider the puzzle that emerges when we combine the following claims: 
                                                 
60 Brown v. Palmer, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991). 
59 
 
1. The Free Exercise Clause singles out religion for protection. 
2. The Establishment Clause singles out religion as ineligible for 
some government benefits. 
3. Because the same term “religion” is used in both the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, what qualifies as religion is 
the same for both clauses. 
4. Some Free Exercise contexts require a broad “conscientious 
objector” definition. 
5. If what qualifies as religion is the same in all legal contexts, then 
the broad “conscientious objector” definition applies in all Free 
Exercise contexts. 
6. If the broad “conscientious objector” definition applies in all 
Establishment Clause contexts, then too much government conduct 
will be forbidden. 
Scholars have attempted to solve this puzzle in different ways.  Before 
considering possible solutions, however, notice that denying 2 only makes matters worse.  
It simply is not plausible to interpret the Establishment Clause as forbidding the 
government from benefiting nonreligious individuals or institutions.  Thus, it is not a 
viable solution to the puzzle to deny 2.  Denying any of the others, however, is a viable 
option. 
 
The Free Exercise Clause Singles Out Religion for Protection 
One way to solve the puzzle is to deny 1, or to deny that the Free Exercise Clause 
singles out religion for protection.  Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager provide 
the best example of those scholars who deny 1.   For Eisgruber and Sager, what “properly 
motivates constitutional solicitude for religious practices is their distinct vulnerability to 
discrimination, not their distinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection 
against discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental concerns” 
60 
 
(Eisgruber 1994, 1248).  Eisgruber and Sager replace “the paradigm of privilege with that 
of protection” (Eisgruber 1994, 1248).  Religion is special in two ways: “religious 
activities are more important than matters of fashion or recreation . . . and people are 
especially likely to undervalue, or persecute, religious activities different from their own” 
(Eisgruber 1994, 1271). 
From this, Eisgruber and Sager advocate a principle of Equal Regard, which 
“requires simply that government treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority 
religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens 
generally” (Eisgruber 1994, 1283).  To qualify for protection, a claimant must show 
“(a) that a general law significantly interferes with some actions motivated by her deep 
religious commitments; and (b) that had her deep, religiously inspired concerns been 
treated with the same regard as that enjoyed by the fundamental concerns of citizens 
generally, she would have been exempted from the reach of the general law” (Eisgruber 
1994, 1285).  Government can accommodate religion only if it similarly accommodates, 
or it similarly would accommodate, nonreligion.  In this way, Eisgruber and Sager deny 
1, or they deny that the Free Exercise Clause singles out religion for protection. 
There are at least three problems with Eisgruber and Sager’s account.  The first 
problem is obvious:  the text of the First Amendment explicitly singles out religion for 
protection.  To require that nonreligion be protected along with religion simply ignores 
the text of the Constitution itself.  
Second, as Michael McConnell points out, while it may be arguable whether the 
religion clauses require religious accommodations, it is clear that the religion clauses at 
least permit religious accommodations (McConnell 2000).  McConnell explains that 
61 
 
among the Framers, some “believed that religious concerns should be given constitutional 
protection, some thought protection for religious concerns was desirable but should be 
left to legislative discretion, and some opposed exemptions altogether; however, no 
member of the First Congress expressed the view that it was improper to extend 
protection to ‘religious sentiments’” (McConnell 2000, 14). 
Third, Eisgruber and Sager’s principle of Equal Regard is incoherent.  For 
instance, “concerns of citizens generally” is not a standard to which a court can compare 
the treatment of religions.  “Some secular interests are strong and some are weak.  
Religious interests cannot be treated equally with respect to both concepts” (McConnell 
2000, 35).  Also, often there will be no secular exemptions with which a court can 
compare the religious exemption.  In such cases, the “inquiry may proceed on a 
hypothetical basis, examining close analogies to form an educated guess about how the 
government would respond if faced with other powerful claims for exemption” 
(McConnell 2000, 36).  It is exceedingly difficult to discern the legislative intent for 
enacted laws, and thus, such a hypothetical inquiry would provide little, if any, guidance.  
Thus, Eisgruber and Sager’s account not only runs counter to the text and history of the 
Free Exercise Clause, but it also ultimately fails to provide courts any standard by which 
to apply the Free Exercise Clause. 
What Qualifies as Religion Is the Same for Both Clauses 
Another way to solve the puzzle is to deny 3, or deny that the definition of the 
term “religion” is the same in both clauses.  Laurence Tribe once proposed defining 
religion broadly for the Free Exercise Clause and narrowly for the Establishment Clause 
(Tribe 1978).  He recognized that denying 3 would allow an expansive definition for the 
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Free Exercise Clause to account for new “legitimate” practices, but avoid an expansive 
definition for the Establishment Clause “lest all ‘humane’ programs of government be 
deemed . . . suspect” (Tribe 1978, 827-28). 
Perhaps denying 3 would be an option if the term “religion” appeared once in 
each clause, but both clauses share one word.  They read, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”61  Thus, 
Tribe’s reading simply ignores the text.  Also, as we have seen, even a single definition 
for each clause fails to account for the fact that what qualifies as religion varies with the 
legal context.  For both reasons, denying 3 is an inadequate solution to the puzzle.  
  
Some Free Exercise Contexts Require a Broad Definition 
Another way to solve the puzzle is to deny 4, or to deny that a broad definition, 
like the “conscientious objector” definition, is ever needed.  The originalist definition that 
we considered in Part II.A. entails such a result.  Yet as previously discussed, the 
traditional originalist definition is too narrow to capture everything that should qualify for 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 62  A narrow definition also would create 
                                                 
61 U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
62 Michael McConnell has argued that the term “religion,” as it was used in the religion clauses, cannot 
extend to matters of conscience.  McConnell’s evidence is that the framers “seriously considered enacting 
constitutional protection for ‘conscience’ . . . and deliberately adopted the term ‘religion’ instead” 
(McConnell 2000, 12).  This “historical fact casts doubt on the suggestion . . . that the constitutional term 
‘religion’ should be broadly interpreted in order to encompass secular claims of conscience,” and thus such 
a broad interpretation “would constitute an amendment, not an interpretation, of the First Amendment, and 
one that the Framers specifically considered, debated, and ultimately rejected” (McConnell 2000, 12). 
If the issue were whether the term “religion” extends to matters of conscience in all legal contexts, then 
the history and text likely entail that “religion” cannot extend to matters of conscience.  In other words, if 
the religion clauses required a single definition, then McConnell would be correct.  However, a single 
definition is not helpful, let alone required, then the “conscientious objector” definition is not required in all 
legal contexts.  Thus, evidence that the Framers rejected the term “conscience” for the term “religion” does 
not necessarily preclude the “conscientious objector” definition in some contexts.   
To see why, consider the following two scenarios where I struggle over which of two words to choose.  
First, I understand what both words express and decide that one captures what I want while the other does 
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Establishment Clause problems.  For example, if neither Santeriaism nor Shintoism 
qualifies as a religion, then the Establishment Clause would not forbid government from 
directly and deliberately subsidizing or advocating them.  When we deny 4 and opt for a 
more narrow definition of the term “religion” in all legal contexts, we solve the puzzle, 
but produce unacceptable, counterintuitive legal results. 
 
A Broad Definition Would Forbid Too Much 
Another way to solve the puzzle is to deny 6, or to deny that a broad 
“conscientious objector” definition would cause the Establishment Clause to forbid too 
much government conduct.  Andrew Koppelman takes this approach.  Koppelman begins 
with what he takes to be a constitutional axiom:  government may not declare religious 
truth (Koppelman 2002).  From this axiom, Koppelman infers that all laws must have a 
secular purpose (Koppelman 2002).  Thus, whether government may accommodate 
religion depends upon whether government can do so while maintaining a secular 
purpose. 
For Koppelman, a law has a secular purpose if it fails to have a “preference more 
specific than support for religion in general” (Koppelman 2002, 90), where “religion in 
general” refers “to the activity of pursuing ultimate questions about the meaning of 
human existence” (Koppelman 2002, 90).  A law has a secular purpose if the social 
meaning of the law would be agreed upon by “nearly any member of society,” which 
turns “on the range of meanings that natives of the culture can reasonably ascribe to the 
                                                 
not.  Second, I understand what both words express and notice that neither fully captures what I want.  In 
the second scenario, I choose the word that best captures what I wish to express, not the word that fully 
captures what I wish to express.  This means that by choosing one, I do not thereby intend to reject the 
other in all contexts.  Thus, if the framers struggled (or were understood to have struggled) over which 
word best identified the type of entities about which they were concerned, the framer’s debate simply 
demonstrates that most of the time the religion clauses do not extend to mere matters of conscience. 
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government action in question” given the “context in which the law was enacted” 
(Koppelman 2002, 115). 
Koppelman characterizes the problem of defining the term “religion” as one of 
finding the proper “level of abstraction” (Koppelman 2002, 129).  Koppelman defines 
“religion” at the most general level and concludes that government “may coherently 
single out [religion in general] for special treatment” (Koppelman 2002, 133).  Rather 
than arguing that nonreligion must be accommodated along with religion, Koppelman 
argues that religion may be singled out for accommodation, but only if religion is defined 
as broadly as possible.  In this way, Koppelman achieves nearly the same practical results 
as Eisgruber and Sager while seemingly respecting 1. 
Koppelman’s account ultimately fails.  First, it is unclear how to determine when 
“nearly any member of society” considers a law to have a secular purpose.  Koppelman 
explains that the requirement depends upon “the range of meanings that natives of the 
culture can reasonably ascribe to the government action in question” given the “context 
in which the law was enacted” (Koppelman 2002, 115, 147).  But what are these?  Do tax 
exemptions for religious organizations, recognition of the priest-penitent privilege, school 
vouchers, the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, or exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws for religious organizations have the requisite social meaning? 
Koppelman suggests an “authoritative way to resolve disputes about social 
meaning”:  courts should use data similar to that gathered in trademark disputes 
(Diamone 2001, 736-60).  If enough people agree both that the government is 
“sponsoring or promoting” religion and that the sponsorship or promotion “conveys a 
message that the government is endorsing the particular religious view,” then the 
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government’s action lacks a secular purpose (Diamone 2001, 749-50).  The problem with 
this is that one’s opinions about whether two advertisements are similar enough to cause 
confusion generally do not depend upon one’s ideology, whereas one’s opinions about 
whether a statute has a religious social meaning do.  There is reasonable disagreement 
over whether the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance “conveys a message 
that the government is endorsing a particular religious view.”63  How do we determine 
whether it does?   
First, we would need to know what the proper question is to ask native speakers.  
Do we ask whether the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance has a secular 
purpose, whether the Pledge of Allegiance as a whole has a secular purpose, or whether, 
overall, public schools have a secular purpose?  Even assuming that the proper question 
is the first, public opinion regarding whether the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance has a secular purpose is unlikely to be the same in, e.g., New York City and 
Salt Lake City.  It is unlikely that there is a single social meaning that “enough” 
Americans ascribe to any given law concerning religion, especially contentious ones, 
which, after all, are those most likely to be litigated. 
Perhaps more important, sometimes a narrower set of entities than what qualifies 
as religion in general requires accommodation.  If the government must accommodate or 
protect “the activity of pursuing ultimate questions about the meaning of existence,” then 
every philosophy department has the same status as religions.  Thus, for example, every 
private school’s philosophy department must be treated same as the Catholic Church.  In 
the end, Koppelman’s account fails to single out religion at all, and thereby suffers from 
the same defects as Eisgruber and Sager’s account. 
                                                 
63 Newdow v. United States, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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What Qualifies as Religion Differs in Differing Legal Contexts 
The best solution to the puzzle is to deny 5, or to deny that what qualifies as a 
religion is the same across all legal contexts.  All other possible solutions to the puzzle 
presuppose that a single definition of the term “religion” is required, or at least that a 
single definition for each clause is required.  Yet as we have seen, what qualifies as 
religion varies as the legal context varies.  Thus, the fact that the priest-penitent privilege 
context requires a narrow definition does not entail that conscientious objectors falling 
outside such a narrow definition do not enjoy protection in other legal contexts.   
There are at least three benefits to understanding that what qualifies as religion in 
the religion clauses differs in differing legal contexts.  First, we will cease the quest for a 
single definition of the term “religion” to assist courts in interpreting the religion clauses.  
We will come to recognize not only that there is no single definition, but also that even if 
there were, it would not be adequate in all legal contexts. 
Second, we will cease attempting to resolve tension between the clauses that does 
not exist.  For example, recognizing that a narrow definition is needed in the priest-
penitent context will no longer lead us to conclude that conscientious objections, similar 
to those made by Seeger and Welsh, should never qualify as religious, or that groups 
falling outside such a narrow definition never implicate the Establishment Clause.  As a 
result, scholars should no longer attempt to solve such illusory problems.  Appreciating 
the contextual nature of what qualifies as religion may not dissolve all tension between 
the two clauses, but it will keep us from developing solutions to problems generated by a 
false assumption—that what qualifies as religion is the same in all legal contexts. 
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Third, we will recognize that we can legitimately draw upon interpretations of 
many other clauses in the Constitution to interpret the religion clauses.  For instance, 
where religious expression is at issue, then the natural place to find relevant parallels is 
the Free Speech Clause.64  Where discrimination against individuals based upon 
membership in a religion is at issue, then the natural place to find relevant parallels is the 
Equal Protection Clause.65  Pointing out that religion does not always function like 
speech, race, or an assembly in some contexts, however, should not prevent courts from 
drawing analogies to these in other contexts.  Perhaps the best way to view the religion 
clauses is as extensions of other clauses into the religious context.66 
Noticing that what qualifies as religion in the religion clauses differs in differing 
legal contexts sheds new light upon religion clause scholarship.  While we still need a 
way to identify religions in specific contexts, we can at least eliminate methods that are 
fundamentally misguided, and in turn, understand that the so-called “tension between the 
clauses” is a problem not worthy of the vast attention that it has received. 
Conclusion 
There is no single definition of the term “religion” as it occurs in ordinary 
English, at least not one that can help interpret and apply of the religion clauses.  The 
reason for this is simple—what qualifies as religion differs across differing legal 
contexts.  A single definition will not work in all legal contexts, and thus, courts and 
scholars should stop attempting to provide a definition of the term “religion” that does.   
                                                 
64 Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) is an example of the Court 
treating religious freedom of expression as a kind of expression protected under the Free Speech Clause.  
65 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), moves free exercise doctrine closer to equal 
protection doctrine, as articulated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
66 For a defense of this reading see McConnell (2000). 
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By recognizing that what qualifies as religion varies as the legal context varies, 
we can see that the vast attention given to the so-called “tension between the clauses” is 
misplaced.  Scholars should discontinue their search for ways to reduce tension that 
presupposes a unique definition of “religion” applies in all legal contexts.  The better 
approach is to view the religion clauses as an extension of other clauses—Free Speech 
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, etc.—into the religious context.  The religion clauses 
forbid certain types of favoritism as well as certain types of discrimination and exclusion.  
The difficult issue left unresolved is determining when the religion clauses forbid these 
things, but at least we should no longer be sidetracked by insignificant definitional 
problems and illusory puzzles. 
The upshot is that even if the Constitution is best understood as incorporating 
concepts, instead of conceptions, semantics provides little guidance for constitutional 








SCRUTINIZING COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
 
Introduction 
The chapter illustrates why placing too much emphasis on concepts and 
definitions ultimately is unhelpful in the task of interpreting the Constitution.  I will 
examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s failed attempt to distinguish between commercial 
speech and noncommercial speech for purposes of interpreting the Free Speech Clause.  
Its failure illustrates why practical considerations, coupled with the imprecision of 
concepts and definitions, suggests that those interpreting the Constitution should focus 
less on definitions.  
On the surface, commercial speech continues to be distinguished from 
noncommercial speech under the First Amendment.  However, a careful analysis of the 
development of commercial speech doctrine reveals that formally abandoning the 
distinction is merely the natural extension of, if not entailed by, commercial speech 
jurisprudence already in place.  It is a distinction without a constitutional difference.  It 
should be, and for the most part has been, formally abandoned. 
 
                                                 
1 Reprinted with kind permission of the George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal.  
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The Instability of Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The text of the First Amendment does not distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, but rather plainly states that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”2  Explaining the text to Congress, James Madison 
stated, “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to 
publish their sentiments.”3  Despite the broad scope of the term “speech," the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 that commercial speech 
motivated by a desire to make a profit does not enjoy protection under the First 
Amendment, controlled commercial speech jurisprudence for more than thirty years.5  
During this period, it became apparent that what seems like a “common sense” distinction 
between commercial speech and noncommercial speech is extremely difficult to draw in 
a constitutionally relevant manner.6 
For example, in New York Times v. Sullivan,7 the Court held that an advertisement 
published in the newspaper was not commercial speech because it “communicated 
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought 
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of 
the highest public interest and concern,” despite that fact that the advertisement sought 
monetary contributions.8  The problems that immediately appear from categorically 
distinguishing commercial speech are that (i) speakers are rarely motivated by a 
                                                 
2 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
3 James Madison Speech to Congress - June 8, 1789. 
4 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
5 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Commission, 413 
U.S. 376 (1973).  
6  See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
7 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
8 Id. at 266. 
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monolithic desire for profit and (ii) it is difficult to determine when speech is sufficiently 
motivated by a desire for profit to warrant a different level of protection.   
For this reason, at times the Court has struggled to classify speech that is 
motivated by a desire to make a profit as noncommercial so that it could protect such 
speech.9  At other times, the Court has held that communications can “constitute 
commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important 
public interest.”10  Indeed, as the Court has recognized, “[t]he diverse motives, means, 
and messages of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely varying 
degrees.”11  Because whether speech is commercial in nature is a matter of degree, it is 
unsurprising that a categorical distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech is difficult to draw. 
The distinction is also difficult to justify.  Even if it were a relatively simple task 
to identify speech sufficiently motivated by a desire for profit, it is not obvious that such 
a motive is relevant to the determination of First Amendment protection.12  In fact, as a 
review of the relevant case law reveals, the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech does not in itself capture a constitutionally relevant difference. 
Eleven years after Sullivan, the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia13 was poised to 
disregard the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech altogether 
                                                 
9 See id.; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (distinguishing on the ground that “the 
advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience”). 
10 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983). 
11 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). 
12 In Board of Trustees of the State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989), the Court 
alternatively defined “commercial speech” as speech that proposes a commercial transaction rather than 
merely speech motivated by profit.  However, to the extent these two definitions differ, it is difficult to see 
a relevant difference for constitutional purposes.  See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (holding that speech that does no more than propose 
a commercial transaction deserves First Amendment protection). 
13 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (reversing a conviction for violating a statute that made publication to 
encourage or promote the processing of an abortion a misdemeanor). 
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when it stated, “speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it 
appears in [advertising] form.” 14  The Court recognized that at least some speech—in 
particular advertising for abortion procedures by for-profit organizations—although 
sufficiently motivated by a desire to make a profit, nonetheless deserves protection equal 
to noncommercial speech.15  However, rather than abandoning the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech altogether, the Court instead distinguished 
Bigelow from prior cases on its facts.16  Thus, after Bigelow, courts still had to choose 
between giving commercial speech full First Amendment protection and giving 
commercial speech no protection at all.  Predictably the definition of “commercial 
speech” alone, which the Court had recognized is a matter of degree, could not sustain 
this dichotomy. 
The Court’s solution was to provide limited First Amendment protection for 
nearly all commercial speech, which lowered the stakes for determining whether speech 
was sufficiently noncommercial to warrant full First Amendment protection.17  In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,18 the Court 
finally afforded First Amendment protection for commercial speech that does “no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”19  In fact, the Court consciously characterized 
the speech as commercial, going so far as to describe the restricted speech as follows:  “I 
will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.” 20  The Court had finally overruled 
Valentine, and in doing so recognized that (i) commercial speech cannot deserve less 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 825. 
16 Id. at 821-25. 
17 See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
18 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 




protection because its content is a commercial subject, (ii) consumer interest in receiving 
commercial speech is as great as hearing political debates, and (iii) the free flow of 
commercial ideas is indispensable.21    
Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of affording commercial speech full First 
Amendment protection and continued to distinguish it from noncommercial speech.22  
Instead, the Court provided the following justification for maintaining the distinction:  
“The truth of commercial speech . . . may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator 
than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser 
seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself 
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.”23  In addition, 
“commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds.  Since advertising is the sine 
qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper 
regulation and forgone entirely.”24  For twenty years after Virginia State Board, the Court 
simply accepted that commercial speech deserved less protection without argument, 
usually by referring to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech as 
one of “common sense.”25   
Despite the Court’s reference to common sense, it is difficult to understand how 
the reasoning in Virginia State Board justifies recognizing less protection for commercial 
speech categorically.  Neither verifiability nor durability is relevant to First Amendment 
                                                 
21 Id. at 761, 763, 765. 
22 Id. at 772, n.24. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498-99 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476, 482 (1995); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 349 
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bolder, 463 U.S. at 64; Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 




protection in any other area, and it is difficult to see why these characteristics are relevant 
to affording commercial speech less protection as a category of speech.  Those who 
express the view that the Holocaust never occurred are espousing a view more open to 
verification than those who claim that expanding the welfare state will result in a more 
just society.  However, greater verifiability does not doom the former view to less 
protection under the First Amendment.  Similarly, durability is not relevant to First 
Amendment protection.  Mainstream political speech is much more durable than political 
speech on the fringes, but the latter does not thereby receive greater First Amendment 
protection.  Even if verifiability and durability were constitutionally relevant, however, 
the category of speech that would deserve less protection would be speech shown to be 
more verifiable and durable.  Commercial speech, which does not always possess these 
characteristics, would not deserve less protection as a category of speech.   
Recognizing the instability of distinguishing commercial speech as a category, the 
Court in recent years has questioned the reasoning in Virginia State Board.  In 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, Justice Stevens questioned the justification for the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.26  In a section formally 
joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens stated that “[r]egulations that 
suppress the truth are no less troubling because they target objectively verifiable 
information, nor are they less effective because they aim at durable messages.”27  Thus, 
“neither the ‘greater objectivity’ nor the ‘greater hardiness’ of truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression with added deference.”28  
                                                 





In 44 Liquormart, Justice Thomas also rejected the Virginia State Board 
reasoning, but he went even further, stating that there is no “philosophical or historical 
basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ 
speech.”29  In addition, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O’Conner, recognized that such 
reasoning had “nothing more than a policy intuition to support it.”30  Justice Scalia made 
this observation even though he was only willing to concur in the result reached by 
Justice Stevens because the parties had not sufficiently briefed the issue of whether the 
Court should formally abandon the distinction.31  It is significant, however, that a 
majority of the Court in 44 Liquormart recognized the inadequacy of the Court’s 
traditional justification of the constitutional distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech.   
Justice Thomas would have further held that any regulation that merely protects 
consumers by keeping them ignorant of commercial speech is per se illegitimate.32  In 
response, Justice Stevens argued that “protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms’” 
can be a sufficient reason for greater regulation of commercial speech.33  But this reason 
for distinguishing commercial speech does not justify submitting regulations of 
commercial speech to less scrutiny; rather, it simply allows, in contrast to Justice 
Thomas’s position, protecting consumers potentially to qualify as a compelling 
governmental interest for restricting speech.  Justice Stevens’ reasoning also accounts for 
the Court’s previous intuition that government has a greater interest in regulating speech 
that is more verifiable—society has little interest in protecting the flow of demonstrably 
                                                 
29 Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
30 Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
31 Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
33 Id. at 502. 
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false information.  This reasoning, however, is entirely consistent with providing the 
same protection, qua standard of review, for commercial speech as any other speech.  
Therefore, the subsequent dialogue by the Court in 44 Liquormart does not reestablish or 
re-recognize a constitutional justification for a categorical distinction between 
commercial speech and noncommercial speech. 
The justification for categorically distinguishing commercial speech from 
noncommercial speech given in Virginia State Board has been recognized as inadequate, 
and no adequate justification has been provided to replace it.  This alone provides a 
compelling reason to abandon the separate doctrines and to provide full protection for 
commercial speech under the First Amendment.  A closer look at the Court’s commercial 
speech cases, however, reveals that the Court has implicitly already done so. 
 
The Road to Strict Scrutiny 
In 1980, the Court outlined a test designed to provide commercial speech an 
intermediate level of protection in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission.34  The following four-part Central Hudson test has since provided 
the analytic framework used to scrutinize regulations that burden commercial speech.  
First, the communication must be “neither misleading nor related to an unlawful 
activity.”35  Second, the “State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by 
restrictions.”36  Third, “the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved.”37  
                                                 
34 447 U.S. at 562-63. 





Fourth, “if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction 
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”38  
This test was designed to help alleviate the inevitable problems that stem from 
choosing between affording speech full protection or no protection at all, depending upon 
whether the speech was sufficiently commercial.  However, subsequent cases reveal that 
the problem of distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech, 
presumably sufficiently mitigated by providing commercial speech limited protection, 
has not gone away.  Instead, the tension and inconsistencies have become manifest in 
interpretations of parts three and four of the Central Hudson test.  In the decade following 
Central Hudson, the Court interpreted the Central Hudson test in Posadas and Fox in a 
way that provided commercial speech little protection from regulation.39  Predictably, this 
led to over-regulation of commercial speech, and again raised the stakes for classifying 
speech as commercial.  Following Posadas and Fox, and as a result of their sanction of 
over regulation, the Court has steadily strengthened the Central Hudson test, which now 
admits little, if any, difference from the protection afforded noncommercial speech. 
In Posadas, the Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute providing that casinos could 
not “advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.”40  In 
applying part three of the Central Hudson test, the Court stated that the statute directly 
advanced the governmental interest by reducing the demand of casino gambling merely 
because advertising, by its very nature, increases the demand for a product.41  By 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332; Fox, 492 U.S. at 482. 
40 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332. 
41 Id. at 342. 
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recognizing such a presumption about the effect of advertising, part 3 presented virtually 
no obstacle for the government to overcome in most cases.  
In applying part 4 of the test, the Court recognized 2 reasons why the Puerto Rico 
statute did not restrict speech more than necessary.42  First, the statute did not ban 
advertising to tourists.43  Second, because the government could have banned gambling 
altogether, it could regulate gambling through the statute.44  The Court also declined to 
consider the possibility of using government speech to counter casino advertising as an 
alternative means of achieving Puerto Rico’s objective.45  In doing so, the Court, in 
effect, left it to legislatures to interpret whether the objective could be achieved by a more 
limited restriction, which simply is part 4 of the Central Hudson test.   
The Court further interpreted part 4 of the Central Hudson test in Fox.  The Court 
rejected the least-restrictive-means test and instead explained that the means/end “fit” 
was “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily 
the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”46  
Therefore, after Posadas and Fox, the government simply could presume that the 
restricted advertising increased the demand for the product, thereby satisfying part 3 of 
the Central Hudson test; and the government itself could determine which means were 
reasonable to serve the interest.  At the time of the Fox decision then, stare decisis was an 
obstacle to affording commercial speech full First Amendment protection.   
                                                 
42 Id. at 343-46. 
43 Id. at 343. 
44 Id. at 346; see also United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993) (upholding ban on 
some casino advertising partly because government could have banned all such advertising). 
45 Id. at 344. 
46 Fox, 482 U.S. at 480 (quotations and citation omitted). 
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Subsequent to Fox, however, the Court has steadily strengthened the Central 
Hudson test, most explicitly in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.47  In Rubin, the Court 
rejected the claim from Posadas that direct advancement of the governmental objective is 
presumed by a restriction on advertising because advertising, by its nature, is designed to 
promote a product.48  The Court also rejected the claim in Posadas that because a 
government could restrict all advertising, or the activity being promoted by the 
advertising, it is free to regulate the commercial speech.49  Finally, the Court considered 
alternative, less-restrictive means as relevant to part four of the Central Hudson test.50  In 
addition, under Rubin, if the government wanted to restrict commercial speech, it had to 
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate 
them to a material degree.” 51  
After Rubin, the Central Hudson test placed a substantial burden on the 
government when it sought to restrict commercial speech.  In fact, parts 3 and 4 have 
come to resemble closely the “narrowly tailored” requirement of strict scrutiny.  The 
most substantial difference between the Central Hudson test and strict scrutiny is that 
part 2 of the former requires only a substantial governmental interest and the latter a 
compelling governmental interest.  But this difference amounts to very little if the Court 
adopts the implication of Justice Stevens’ view in 44 Liquormart that protecting 
                                                 
47 514 U.S. 476 (1995).  The strengthening of the Central Hudson test was foreshadowed in Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), where the Court stated that courts and legislatures had 
“attache[d] more importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech [than we 
do] . . . and [had] seriously under estimate[d] the value of commercial speech.”  Id. at 419. 
48 Id. at 490; see also Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189 
(1999) (rejecting unsupported presumption that casino advertising increased demand for gambling). 
49 Id. at 483 n.2. 
50 Id. at 488. 
51 Id. at 487. 
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consumers qualifies as a compelling governmental interest.52  Adopting this view also 
accounts for part 1 of the Central Hudson test because protecting consumers will be 
needed most when the speech is misleading or promotes an unlawful activity.  Adopting 
Justice Thomas’s more sweeping view⎯that protecting consumers is per se 
illegitimate⎯would be a more substantial departure from the present Central Hudson 
test.  However, as discussed earlier, the debate between Justices Stevens and Thomas is, 
in substance, independent of the debate over which level of scrutiny to apply when 
reviewing restrictions on commercial speech.  Because of this, extending full First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech, after 44 Liquormart, did not cut against the 
Court’s precedent. 
After 44 Liquormart, the Court applied the Central Hudson test in Greater New 
Orleans Broadcasting Assoc. v. United States,53 to invalidate a restriction on radio 
advertising for private casinos.  Greater New Orleans is also consistent with recognizing 
no distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.  The Court did not depart 
from its interpretation of the Central Hudson test in 44 Liquormart and Rubin.  Indeed, 
the Greater New Orleans Court explicitly stated that it was not replacing the Central 
Hudson test because the case presented “no need to break new ground [where] . . . 
Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an 
adequate basis for decision.”54  The reason for this is that the “more recent cases,” which 
included Rubin and 44 Liquormart, in substance, had abandoned lesser scrutiny for 
commercial speech. 
                                                 
52 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502. 
53 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
54 527 U.S. at 184. 
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Since Greater New Orleans, the Court has twice refused to confront directly the 
issue of whether the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech should 
be formally abandoned.  Both times, the Court stated that, as in Greater New Orleans, the 
case presented “no need to break new ground.”55  However, once again the test applied 
by the Court is functionally not one of lesser scrutiny.  While in the first case, Lorrilard 
Tobacco v. Reilly, the Court stated that it need not apply the least-restrictive-means test of 
strict scrutiny to examine the commercial speech restrictions, in the second case,56 
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court struck down the government 
restrictions because there were alternatives that only the Court had considered.57  In fact, 
as the dissent in Thompson noted, to the extent some type of lesser scrutiny still applies to 
commercial speech restrictions, the majority has “applie[d] the commercial speech 
doctrine too strictly.”58  While the dissent correctly characterized the test applied by the 
majority, the proper criticism is not that the Court has abandoned lesser scrutiny for 
commercial speech restrictions, but rather that it has done so without formal 
announcement.   
 
Conclusion 
Affording commercial speech full First Amendment protection is the natural 
extension of (and perhaps entailed by) the Court’s jurisprudence already in place.  Just as 
the Court has come to recognize that regulations on sexually-explicit but nonobscene 
                                                 
55 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted); 
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted). 
56 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 555. 
57 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 372-73. 
58 Id. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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speech must survive strict scrutiny,59 the Court implicitly has come to recognize that 
commercial speech deserves no less protection.  The distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech is a distinction without a constitutional difference.  More 
important, the constitutional differences not only do not track the distinction, but carry 
too much significance for an imprecise definition to bear.  The Court should be cautious 
in attempting to clarify definitions prior to engaging the constitutional analysis, as the 
more fruitful approach will nearly always be to settle upon definitions, if necessary at all, 
as part of constitutional analysis.   
 
                                                 
59 Compare Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), with United States v. Playboy 







TAKING LIBERTY WITH HUMEAN NECESSITY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a different kind of example of the relationship between law 
and philosophy.  In this chapter, I will illustrate another way in which philosophy can 
help those engaging in legal analysis avoid taking wrong turns, even if philosophy cannot 
definitively indicate the direction legal analysis should take.  The example involves the 
relationship between philosophical debates concerning free will and legal debates over 
the extent to which free will is relevant to legal accountability.   
Many scholars consider compatibilists to argue persuasively against so-called 
libertarians (roughly, those who deny that causal necessity applies to actions we consider 
free), but fail to address seriously the concerns of so-called hard determinists (roughly, 
those who deny that there are free actions because causal necessity applies to actions we 
consider free).  David Hume is taken to exemplify this shortcoming in compatibilist 
accounts.  In his chapters on liberty and necessity, Hume argues that we cannot plausibly 
deny that causal necessity applies to actions we consider free, but provides no reason to 
believe that the actions we consider free actually are free.  In other words, Hume argues 
                                                 
126 Reprinted with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.  Springer, Moral Psychology 
Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will, 2008, 207-23, Taking Liberty with Humean 
Necessity: Compatibilism and Contingency, Troy L. Booher. 
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that the libertarian notion of freedom is implausible, but does not provide a positive 
account of free action that explains why hard determinists are mistaken when they claim 
that causal necessity precludes actions from being free.  This apparent shortcoming 
leaves hard determinists understandably unsatisfied.   
This traditional reading of Hume is mistaken, and understanding why sheds light 
on the perennial debate between compatibilists and hard determinists, which, in turn, 
sheds light upon how the law should (not) address legal responsibility with science alone.  
Hume not only provides an adequate positive account of freedom (i.e., of the kind of 
freedom required for moral accountability and agency), but, once properly understood, 
also provides insight into why arguments between compatibilists and hard determinists 
cannot be resolved in the abstract and seem to end in stalemate.  In short, Hume’s account 
reveals that the question of whether causal necessity precludes the kind of freedom 
required for moral responsibility and agency depends upon contingent, empirical facts, 
and therefore the answer to this question could change over time.  If this account is 
correct, the “winner takes all” framing of the disputes between hard determinists and 
compatibilists is misguided and misleading.   
To reach this conclusion, however, it is important first to understand why the 
traditional reading of Hume is incorrect.  Toward that end, this essay first describes an 
interpretative puzzle generated by Hume’s chapters on liberty and necessity and then 
provides a solution to that puzzle.  The solution reveals that Hume’s account of freedom 
is not contained in his chapters on liberty and necessity as the traditional reading of 
Hume supposes, but instead is contained in Hume’s discussion of moral sentiments.  
Hume’s positive account of freedom places him in the ‘reactive attitudes’ camp of 
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compatibilists, but with a recognition that reactive attitudes can change.  This recognition 
permits Hume’s account to explain the fact that views on agency and responsibility have 
changed throughout history, reveals how disputes between hard determinists and 
compatibilists can be resolved, and, perhaps, sheds new light on contemporary 
disagreements over whether, for example, genetic predispositions are relevant to moral 
responsibility, and if so, how. 
 
The Interpretative Puzzle 
Hume describes his Treatise discussion of liberty and necessity as putting “the 
whole controversy in a new light, by giving a new definition of necessity” (Hume 1998, 
661).  According to this new definition, necessity consists in “the constant union [of 
objects] and the inference of the mind” (Hume 1978, 400).  Paul Russell has argued that 
many traditional interpretations of Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity fail 
because they provide a role for Hume’s definition that is merely consistent with the rest 
of his discussion instead of essential to it (Russell 1995).  While Russell’s criticism is 
well taken, surprisingly, Russell’s own interpretation of Hume is subject to the same 
criticism.  Russell’s interpretation does not explain what Hume meant when he said that 
his “new definition of necessity” put “the whole controversy in a new light.”   
One of the great merits of Russell’s book is that it reveals a major interpretive 
puzzle.  Different interpretations of Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity can be 
understood as attempts to solve this puzzle.  The following three claims are all 
persuasively attributed to Hume by Russell (1995): 
Humean Necessity:  Necessity consists in the constant union of objects 
and the inference of the mind.  
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Anti-libertarian Claim:  Any liberty that means a lack of necessity does 
not exist and would make morality impossible.  
Internal Cause Claim:  Free actions are distinguished from unfree ones, 
not by the absence of a cause, but rather by the type of cause (11-12). 
Conjoining these three claims leads to an interpretive puzzle, which is described below. 
According to one possible interpretation of Hume, someone acts freely just 
whenever the cause of her action is of the right type, for instance, her willing.127  On this 
interpretation, recognizing the Internal Cause Claim is all that is essential to 
understanding when actions are free.  But notice that if freedom requires compliance only 
with the Internal Cause Claim, then it seems that Humean Necessity is not essential to 
Hume’s discussion.  If we distinguish free actions by the type of cause, then it is 
irrelevant what account we give of the necessity involved in the causal relation.128  
Hume’s announcement that his new definition of necessity puts the whole controversy in 
a new light, however, requires an essential role for Humean Necessity to play.  This 
interpretation seems inadequate because Humean Necessity is merely consistent with the 
overall discussion rather than essential to it.  Call this the ‘Not Essential Problem.’ 
It is tempting to think that this way of reading Hume can easily be amended to 
provide an essential role for Humean Necessity:  it is essential because a ‘stronger’ kind 
of necessity would threaten freedom.129  After all, Hume believes that a ‘weaker’ kind of 
necessity destroys freedom, as the Anti-libertarian Claim shows.  Hume also believes that 
                                                 
127 This position is advanced by Thomas Hobbes.  Hobbes argues that my actions are free when “I can do as 
I will,” which is compatible with necessity in free actions (Chappell 1999, 16).  Hobbes does not subscribe 
to Hume’s definition of necessity, and thus it seems unlikely that Hume’s new definition plays an essential 
role for this type of compatibilism. 
128 Following Hume, I assume throughout that causal relations are ‘inseparable’ from necessity.  Because of 
this, I will sometimes speak of causal relations and other times of necessary connections, but both are 
implied whenever either is used.  I also assume that puzzles involving determinism and free will or free 
action do not differ significantly from puzzles involving causal necessity and free will or free action. 
129 This position is advanced by John Stuart Mill (1874). 
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mistaking mere causation for compulsion—in Hume’s terms, for “force, and violence, 
and constraint”—is a major confusion that leads others to find necessity a threat to 
freedom (Hume 1978, 407).  So perhaps the essential role that Humean Necessity plays is 
that it allows one to respect the Anti-libertarian Claim while distinguishing actions that 
are caused from actions that are compelled. 
This amended interpretation suffers from three problems.  First, it seems to ignore 
Hume’s Internal Cause Claim, which states that we identify actions as free by reference 
to the type of cause.  Second, it is a mistake to think that Humean Necessity aids in 
distinguishing causation from compulsion.  Whether an action is compelled depends upon 
the type of cause rather than the type of necessity involved in the causal relation itself.  
The difference between a person going across the room because she is pushed and 
because she wants a drink of water requires reference to types of causes and not the types 
of necessity involved in the causal relations.  Third, while some contemporary 
compatibilists may want to hold a position akin to the amended interpretation, such a 
position cannot be attributed to Hume.  A compatibilist could maintain that in all possible 
worlds where the type of necessity is ‘stronger’ than Humean Necessity, there are no free 
actions.  Hume, however, believed that a ‘stronger’ necessary connection would not 
threaten freedom.  
For Hume, an action must be free for it to be an action for which one could 
properly be held responsible.  But whether one can properly be held responsible depends 
upon dispositions to praise and blame.  Thus, unless believing that there was a ‘stronger’ 
causal relation would alter dispositions to praise and blame, the ‘stronger’ causal relation 
would not affect our practice of holding each other responsible; nor should it affect our 
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practice for Hume as long as our relevant sentiments continue to approve of our practice 
overall.  But we should not expect such effects, or anyway, we should not attribute that 
expectation to Hume.  In the Enquiry, Hume argues that even if one were convinced that 
(i) the Creator initially caused whatever originates all actions and (ii) every deed was 
contributing to an overall good, these convictions would have little affect upon our moral 
ascriptions because “[t]he mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance 
of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of 
approbation or blame” (Hume 1975, 102).  Hume did not believe that moral ascriptions 
would be affected by belief in a ‘stronger’ causal connection. 
The amended interpretation of the role that Hume provides for Humean Necessity 
is mistaken, not simply because it misunderstands what it takes for an action we consider 
free to be compelled, but also because it wrongly interprets Hume as thinking that a 
‘stronger’ causal relation would threaten freedom.  Call this the ‘Not Hume Problem.’   
The interpretive puzzle has now emerged.  How can one provide an interpretation 
of Hume that distinguishes free actions by the type of cause, and yet provides Humean 
Necessity an essential and acceptable role to play? 
Paul Russell has attempted to solve this interpretative puzzle.  Russell correctly 
points out that (i) moral praise and blame are, according to Hume, felt rather than judged, 
(ii) one must have access to another’s character to have the necessary moral feeling, and 
(iii) one can have access to another’s character only by making a causal inference.  The 
necessity involved in causation is consequently needed for the moral sentiments of praise 
and blame (Russell 1995).130  Thus, according to Russell, Humean Necessity is essential 
                                                 
130 Russell’s actual argument is as follows:  
1. Approval and disapproval are essential to morality. 
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because, without it, Hume has no basis to claim that we have access to another’s 
character to judge her.  Russell’s interpretation avoids the Not Essential Problem and the 
Not Hume Problem. 
Russell’s interpretation fails.  Although Russell has outlined a position Hume 
holds, Russell has failed to explain why Hume thinks that he has shed “new light” on the 
“long disputed question of liberty and necessity” in the Treatise “by giving a new 
definition of necessity.”  It is essential to judging someone responsible that one make 
inferences between character and actions.  It is also essential to making those inferences 
properly that one experience a constant conjunction between types of character and types 
of actions, which certainly essentially involves Humean Necessity.  However, this does 
not explain why Hume thinks that his definition of necessity sheds any new light on the 
problem.  The inference between character and actions requires at least Humean 
Necessity, but it does not require Humean Necessity specifically.  The much ‘stronger’ 
understandings of necessity that Hume is arguing against in the Treatise would allow 
inferences from actions to character just as well.  In fact, any account of causal necessity 
that implies causal connections are inferentially detectable, or at least have constant 
conjunction as a consequence, will work.  Russell has found an essential role for Humean 
Necessity, but has failed to find the essential role that Hume claims puts the “whole 
controversy in a new light.” 
                                                 
2. Only character traits or mental qualities arouse our moral sentiments of approval and 
disapproval. 
3. Knowledge of a person’s character traits or mental qualities requires inference. 
4. A person or thinking being is held responsible if we regard her as an object of a moral 
sentiment. 
5. Regarding an agent as responsible is, therefore, a matter of feeling not judgment. 
6. Without inference to character (i.e., necessity), no such feeling could, as a matter of 
psychological fact, be aroused in us, and therefore no one could be regarded as responsible. 





Solution to the Interpretative Puzzle 
To solve the interpretive puzzle, the controversy Hume thought he was shedding 
light upon must be considered more carefully.  Plainly enough, the controversy Hume 
was addressing was the controversy during the time he wrote, which perhaps is best 
understood by examining the debate concerning liberty and necessity between Thomas 
Hobbes and John Bramhall.  
Bramhall claims that real necessity and true liberty are incompatible with one 
another.  Bramhall makes this claim by drawing upon the common intuition that “if it be 
inevitably imposed upon me . . . [it is] impossible for me to choose whether I shall 
undergo it or not” (Chappell 1999, 43).  Bramhall, however, does not deny that free 
actions have causes.  Instead, he merely denies that these causes necessitate free actions 
in the same way as causes that do not involve free actions necessitate their effects.  One 
way Bramhall does this is by drawing a (somewhat unclear) distinction between 
“absolute necessity” and “necessity upon supposition.”  Bramhall claims that only the 
latter type of necessity applies to free actions.  Hobbes refuses to draw this distinction, 
thereby provoking Bramhall to distinguish two kinds of necessity: 
[T]here is a great difference between determining and being determined.  
If all the collateral causes concurring to the production of an effect were 
antecedently determined, what they must of necessity produce and when 
they must produce it, then there is no doubt but the effect is necessary.  
But if these causes did operate freely or contingently, if they might have 
suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred after another 
manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but 
either free or contingent . . . .  So [human] necessity is no absolute, no 
antecedent, extrinsical necessity, but merely a necessity upon supposition 
(Chappell 1999, 44). 
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While this paragraph contains a number of claims worth discussion, for understanding the 
‘controversy,’ it is important to note only that Bramhall believes his distinction between 
two kinds of necessity is required to explain both how actions are free and how free 
actions involve contingency. 
In contrast, Hobbes argues for the familiar position previously outlined as having 
the Not Essential Problem.  Hobbes claims that if the will causes an action, then the 
action is free, and that this kind of freedom is compatible with there being only one kind 
of necessity (Chappell 1999).  Only the type of cause determines whether an action is free 
for Hobbes, and thus, the ‘strength’ of the necessity involved in the causal relation is 
irrelevant.  There is no reason to recognize two kinds of necessity because the existence 
of free actions does not depend upon it.  Ultimately, the debate between Hobbes and 
Bramhall boils down to disagreement over whether more than one type of necessity is 
needed to account for free actions.  That was the controversy at the time Hume wrote.   
This controversy is one on which Hume’s new definition of necessity does shed 
light.  Hume admits that it is conceivable that given any cause the effect will fail to occur 
(Hume 1978).  Hume nonetheless believes that the same kind of necessity applies to all 
cause/effect relations.  Hume accounts for the common intuition Bramhall relies upon—
that no “absolute necessity” applies to free actions—but only because Hume finds no 
“absolute necessity” in any causal relation.  As Hume states, “I do not ascribe to the will 
that unintelligible necessity, which is suppos’d to lie in matter[; instead] I ascribe to 
matter, that intelligible quality . . . which [all] must allow to belong to the will.  I change, 
therefore, nothing in the receiv’d systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to 
material objects” (Hume 1978, 410).  
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Hume also agrees with Hobbes that there is no reason to posit more than one kind 
of necessity.  Thus, Hume’s new definition of necessity resolves the Hobbes/Bramhall 
controversy by acknowledging contingency in free actions without positing two kinds of 
necessity.  For Hume, “there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of 
cause, and . . . the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without 
any foundation in nature” (Hume 1978, 171).  The controversy that Humean Necessity 
resolves is whether free actions are necessitated just as other natural events, not whether 
or how actions are free.  Because both Hobbes and Bramhall simply assume that there are 
free actions (actions for which one can be held accountable), there was no controversy on 
that issue.131 
Interpreting Hume as referring to the Hobbes/Bramhall controversy in the 
Abstract explains the essential role that Humean Necessity plays in Hume’s discussion of 
liberty and necessity while avoiding both the Not Essential Problem and the Not Hume 
Problem.  The Not Essential Problem is that if free actions are distinguished by the type 
of cause, then Humean Necessity is inessential to Hume’s account of liberty.  To say that 
Humean Necessity is inessential to Hume’s account of liberty, however, is not to say that 
it is inessential to resolving the controversy at the time.  Humean Necessity resolves the 
controversy over whether the same kind of necessity applies both to free actions and to 
other natural events.  It is this controversy that Hume’s new definition of necessity plays 
an essential and acceptable role in resolving. 
The Not Hume Problem is that providing an essential role for Humean Necessity 
seems to imply that a ‘stronger’ causal relation would rule out freedom, and this is not 
                                                 
131 Anthony Collins and Samuel Clarke have a debate similar to the one between Hobbes and Bramhall.  
Collins and Clarke make only slightly different distinctions, and Hume’s new definition of necessity 
similarly resolves their controversy (Clarke 1999; O’Higgins 1976; Ferguson 1974). 
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Hume’s view.  While Hume argues that there is no ‘stronger’ causal relation, Hume also 
believes that free actions would not be compromised if there were a ‘stronger’ causal 
relation.  Hume does appear to believe that the contingency recognized by Humean 
Necessity explains the intuition exploited by Bramhall that there is contingency in human 
action, but this does not mean that Hume must agree with Bramhall that ‘stronger’ 
necessity would threaten free actions.  Taking Hume to refer to the Hobbes/Bramhall 
controversy when he says that his “new definition of necessity” sheds “new light” on the 
“long disputed question of liberty and necessity” solves the interpretive puzzle.   
Taking Hume to refer to the Hobbes/Bramhall controversy also makes better 
sense of Hume’s sections on liberty and necessity in both the Treatise and the Enquiry.  
Hume’s argument in the Treatise is structured in two stages.  Hume first points out that 
(i) necessity is the constant union of objects and the inference of the mind and (ii) free 
actions are united together just as regularly and produce inferences in the mind just as 
often as other natural events.  As a result, there is no reason to deny that free actions are 
necessitated because (i) we can predict free actions just as well as other natural events; 
(ii) predictions are based upon cause/effect reasoning; and (iii) necessity and cause/effect 
relations are inseparable.  Because Hume has previously argued that Humean Necessity 
applies to all natural events, Hume’s argument directly implies that there is only one kind 
of necessity.  Hume’s new definition shows that the same kind of necessity applies both 
to free actions and to other natural events because, given Hume’s definition, nobody 
would deny that Humean Necessity applies to both.  In this way, Hume’s new definition 
directly resolves the Hobbes/Bramhall controversy.  This is the bulk of Hume’s argument 
in the Treatise (Hume 1978). 
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In what remains, Hume explains why people mistakenly deny that necessity 
applies to free actions.  First, people confuse liberty of spontaneity (an internal cause) 
with liberty of indifference (a lack of necessity) (Hume 1978).  Hume points out that free 
action requires only the former.  Second, people have a false sensation of liberty of 
indifference when they act and therefore believe they could have chosen whether to do 
otherwise (Hume 1978).  The sensation is false, however, because given enough 
information about circumstances, character, and motives, human behavior is just as 
predictable as that of a watch.  Finally, people mistakenly assert that morality and 
responsibility require liberty of indifference (Hume 1978).  Hume shows that 
responsibility instead requires Humean Necessity because one needs to infer motive and 
character from action in order to judge another properly.  So Russell is correct that this is 
an essential role of Humean Necessity, but he is incorrect that this is the essential role 
that sheds “new light” on “the controversy.”   
Hume’s argument in the Enquiry differs only slightly.  Hume argues that because 
causal necessity is at most union and inference, it applies to free actions just as it applies 
to other natural events.  Hume then defines “liberty” as “a power of acting or not acting, 
according to the determinations of the will” (Hume 1975, 95).  In the Treatise, Hume 
defined “will” as “the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we 
knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind” 
(Hume 1978, 399).  Thus, Hume is referring to liberty of spontaneity of the Treatise.  
Hume thinks that no one would deny that we have this kind of liberty, the kind required 
by the Internal Cause Claim and the Antilibertarian Claim.  
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Hume then argues that there is no liberty of indifference because a lack of 
necessity implies a lack of cause, which reduces the occurrence to mere chance.  This is a 
reductio for Hume because he had previously argued that no philosopher accepts that 
chance occurs in this sense (Hume 1978; 1975).  Again, the bulk of Hume’s argument is 
designed to show that one cannot plausibly deny Humean Necessity applies to free 
actions, just as it does to other natural events. 
Hume’s sections on liberty and necessity in both the Treatise and the Enquiry are 
designed to show both that actions we consider free involve Humean Necessity just as 
other natural events and this result is required for actions to be free.  Hume’s discussion 
resolves the Hobbes/Bramhall controversy because (i) Humean Necessity consists only of 
constant conjunction and inference, both of which are obviously present in actions we 
consider free, and (ii) Humean Necessity is consistent with the intuition that there is 
contingency in these actions.   
 
The Threat of Hard Determinism 
The fact that Hume was primarily addressing the controversy at the time also 
explains why Hume’s chapters on liberty and necessity, standing alone, contribute little to 
current controversies concerning free action.  Neither Hobbes nor Bramhall doubts that 
there are free actions; they instead disagree over how to account for the fact that there are 
free actions.  Thus, Hume had no reason to address the specific concerns of hard 
determinists in those chapters.132  
                                                 
132  Although libertarians, as incompatibilists, share some concerns with hard determinists, there was little 
reason for Hume to take hard determinism itself seriously because the only hard determinist at Hume’s time 
appears to have been Baron d’Holbach. 
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Yet Hume’s chapters on liberty and necessity are incomplete precisely because he 
does not take the concerns of hard determinists seriously.  Hume argues that the actions 
we consider free must involve causal necessity because Humean Necessity (i) applies to 
all events and (ii) is required for agency and moral responsibility.  Hume does not seem 
to consider the possibility that causal necessity also precludes actions from being free in 
the sense we care about, that is, in the sense relevant to moral accountability and agency.  
While there are metaphysical puzzles involving free will and free action that are 
interesting for their own sake, the primary motivation of most scholars who attempt to 
solve such puzzles is the perceived threat to moral responsibility and agency (Dennett 
1984).  As Jay Wallace recognized, “[w]hat we want is not freedom of the will per se, but 
the kind of freedom that makes us persons, or deliberators, or autonomous valuers, or 
morally accountable agents; a desire for freedom that floated loose from all such contexts 
would be a kind of fetish” (Wallace 1996, 2-3).  Galen Strawson shares this view:  
whether human beings are ever morally deserving of praise or blame or punishment or 
reward “is the only really troublesome question when it comes to the problem of free 
will” (Strawson 2002, 441).  Hume was not content merely to show that Bramhall could 
not posit different kinds of necessity to distinguish free actions.  Rather, Hume further 
argued that a lack of Humean Necessity would undermine moral responsibility.  Hume 
recognized that an account of free will or free action that had no implications for moral 
responsibility is of little interest.  For this reason, I also discuss freedom only insofar as it 
affects agency and moral responsibility.  If it turns out that we have no free will, but this 
fact has (and should have) no impact on our lives as moral agents, then there remains 
little reason to continue to argue over whether we have free will. 
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For hard determinists, then, regardless of what account we provide of causal 
necessity, if the same necessity applies to actions we consider free as applies, for 
example, to falling rocks, then moral accountability and agency are precluded.  Hume has 
argued that if there are free actions, then they must involve causal necessity, but Hume 
has not argued that there are free actions (actions for which one can be held morally 
accountable).  Yet this is precisely what the hard determinist denies. 
In fact, the only positive account of free action Hume provides in his chapters on 
liberty and necessity is that for actions to be free, they must have the right type of cause 
(one’s will).  Yet such an account is plainly inadequate to address the concerns of the 
hard determinist:  an action caused by one’s will is not sufficient for the action to exhibit 
the type of freedom needed for moral accountability.  Some actions caused by the will are 
not free in the relevant sense, namely actions performed by kleptomaniacs or small 
children.  Despite such obvious difficulties, numerous scholars have assumed that the 
Internal Cause Claim represents Hume’s positive account of freedom in its entirety 
(Berofsky 2002).133  We should avoid attributing such a superficial account of freedom to 
Hume if possible. 
Taking Hume’s positive account of freedom to come from his chapters on liberty 
and necessity not only saddles Hume with a superficial account, but it also locates Hume 
within a debate foreign to him.  Hume is typically considered a “traditional 
compatibilist,” belonging to a line of argument later developed by Moore (1912), Hobart 
(1934), Ayer (1954), Schlick (1966), and Davidson (1973), who advocate a hypothetical 
or conditional account of freedom.  Very roughly, these conditional accounts of freedom 
hold that if one had chosen to do (or desired or willed) X, then he or she would have done 
                                                 
133 This point is explained in detail by Paul Russell (1995). 
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X.  Incompatibilists typically respond to traditional compatibilists by arguing that the 
concern is not that one’s choice (or desire or will) does not cause the action, but rather 
that if causal necessity applies universally, one has no control over the choice (or desire 
or willing) in the first place (Kane 1996; Klein 1990).  Philosophers then engage in what 
is at base a dispute over the extent to which conditional accounts can survive logical 
analysis and yet account for whatever ‘control’ is needed for moral accountability (Lehrer 
1966; Inwagen 1983; Berofsky 2002).  
For example, Keith Lehrer argues that the analysis of “S can X” cannot be the 
conditional “If C, then S X’s” because this conditional (whatever C is) is logically 
consistent with “S cannot X” (Lehrer 1966).  Hume’s response to such an argument 
would not be to provide a more sophisticated analysis of the relevant conditional, which 
is the response of the so-called traditional compatibilists (e.g., Chisholm 1964; Davidson 
1973), but would be to show that such considerations are beside the point.  Such logical 
analyses, on Hume’s view, have no direct implications for moral responsibility:  For 
Hume, what looks like reasoning on moral matters is not a sequence of logically valid 
inferences, but is directing attention to matters that engage the moral sentiments (Hume 
1975, Appendix I).134  The logical implications of the relevant conditionals have no direct 
moral implications for Hume, but instead have moral relevance only to the extent they 
affect moral sentiments.  Hume argues that it is not relations detected by reason—such as 
similarities between parricide by oak trees and parricide by humans or between incest 
involving humans and incest involving other animals (Hume 1978)—which explain the 
viciousness of an action or character, but rather “a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
                                                 
134 It is noteworthy that Hume’s account, despite its use of the term “character,” is consistent with claims 




contemplation of it” (Hume 1978, 469).  Hume would think that both sides of the debate 
over the plausibility of traditional compatibilism simply “over-intellectualize the facts” 
(Russell 1995, 73; Strawson 1962, 78). 
Recall Hume’s claim in the Enquiry that even if we were convinced that the 
Creator initially caused whatever causes all actions and every action was contributing to 
an overall good, it would have little effect upon our moral ascriptions because “[t]he 
mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, 
dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame” 
(Hume 1975, 102).  It must first be determined whether it matters to moral accountability 
that the Creator is the ultimate cause of actions before it becomes necessary to find 
creative metaphysical routes to avoid implications for moral accountability.  Unless 
incompatibilists’ arguments cause us to disapprove of our overall practice of holding each 
other (or ourselves) accountable, or at least cause us to do so in individual instances, then 
such arguments simply have little to do with moral accountability for Hume.135  
 
Humean Compatibilism 
There is a contemporary strand of compatibilism that is consistent with Hume’s 
views:  the reactive attitudes approach developed by Peter Strawson (1962).  For 
Strawson, the question of under which conditions an agent is morally accountable is best 
                                                 
135 Hume likely would have responded similarly to a related debate over whether alternative possibilities 
are necessary for moral responsibility (Frankfurt 1969; Kane 1996; Ekstrom 2002).  The use of 
counterexamples in moral debate suggests that issues of moral responsibility admit a precise rational 
structure, a claim that Hume would deny (Hume 1975, Appendix I).  Perhaps when we consider Frankfurt 
counterexamples our moral sentiments disapprove of the conduct described, but when we consider the 
further information that causal necessity applies to all actions we consider free, our moral sentiments 
change.  Any resemblance between the two cases that may suggest a reasonable person must treat them the 
same way is beside the point for Hume—again, as his parricide and incest examples are designed to show 
(Hume 1978).  It is a mistake to make rigid distinctions and then to impose a rational structure using those 
rigid distinctions upon something that has none, namely the conditions admitting of moral responsibility. 
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understood as the question of under which conditions it is appropriate to hold an agent 
morally accountable.  And because the latter conditions are explained in terms of “natural 
human reactions”—that is, susceptibility to reactive attitudes—moral accountability 
consists in adopting these attitudes toward one another (Strawson 1962).  Strawson 
argues that we cannot give up such natural reactive attitudes because they play such a 
central part of our lives, and we should not give up these attitudes because it would 
impoverish human life, especially interpersonal relationships.   
Some scholars have responded to Strawson’s arguments by pointing out that, as a 
matter of fact, (i) human life would not be as impoverished as Strawson claims because 
he has exaggerated the extent to which our reactive attitudes would have to be altered 
(Pereboom 1995), and (ii) we could at least give up certain reactive attitudes in 
appropriate circumstances (Russell 1992).  Jay Wallace defends Strawson in light of 
these attacks (Wallace 1996).  Wallace concedes that we could abandon the relevant 
reactive attitudes (for Wallace, resentment, indignation, and guilt) but argues that 
Strawson’s second claim remains persuasive:  even if causal necessity does apply to all 
actions we consider free, there is no reason that we should give up our reactive attitudes 
or, consequently, our practice of holding agents morally accountable (Wallace 1996). 
Wallace points out that incompatibilists make unwarranted assumptions about 
moral responsibility.  Specifically, incompatibilists assume that if causal necessity applies 
to actions we consider free, then it is thereby unfair to hold agents accountable for such 
actions (Wallace 1996).  Wallace argues that in the conditions under which we typically 
find it unfair to hold agents accountable—for example, insanity, addiction, hypnotism, 
torture—it is the absence of the ability to grasp and act from moral reasons (either 
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generally or in a specific instance) that explains the unfairness (Wallace 1996)  Wallace 
claims that agency, which most hard determinists also consider to be threatened by causal 
necessity, is essentially constituted by the ability to grasp and act from moral reasons 
(Wallace 1996).  If correct, then the generalization made by incompatibilists from typical 
excusing or exempting conditions to all action involving causal necessity is unwarranted 
because causal necessity does not preclude one from grasping or acting from moral 
reasons. 
Hume belongs to this strand of compatibilism.  As Paul Russell correctly 
observes, for Hume “[o]ne knows an agent is responsible only if one is aware of that 
person’s causing a certain sentiment of approbation or blame” (Russell 1995, 64).  
Because ultimately all moral assessments concerning the fairness of holding one 
accountable are derived from moral sentiments, the fairness of holding one accountable 
for actions involving causal necessity depends upon how this affects moral sentiments.  
Hume’s account is consistent with much of what Wallace claims. 
Despite the similarities between Hume and Wallace, however, the differences are 
significant, and it is beneficial to examine them in some detail.  Wallace believes it is the 
fact that one grasps and acts from moral reasons that explains (or partially constitutes) the 
conditions in which our moral sentiments136 are appropriate, whereas Hume believes that 
grasping and acting from moral reasons is significant only because our moral sentiments 
so inform us.  In other words, for Hume there is no reason why objects that do not grasp 
or act from moral reasons are inappropriate objects of praise and blame, as it is simply a 
                                                 
136I use “moral sentiments” only to refer to the relevant moral sentiments corresponding to the reactive 
attitudes at issue (Wallace 1996, 33).  Wallace recognizes that such a move to what he calls “dispositional” 




psychological fact that certain objects in certain circumstances arouse our moral 
sentiments.  Any relationship between moral responsibility and grasping and acting from 
moral reasons is a contingent one for Hume.  For Wallace, this relationship is essential to 
his accounts of agency and moral responsibility.   
 
Advantages of Hume’s Account 
Hume’s account of agency and moral responsibility has distinct advantages over 
Wallace’s account.  Hume’s account makes better sense of historical changes in the 
practice of identifying agents and free actions and permits us to diagnose, and perhaps 
end, the perpetual stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. 
Wallace holds that only creatures with an ability to grasp and act from moral 
reasons qualify as agents (Wallace 1996).  History does not reflect this view.  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes traced the forms of liability from ancient societies through the English 
common law (1991).  As Holmes describes, many societies have attached liability to 
inanimate objects and animals when they were “the immediate cause of offense” (Holmes 
1991, 10).  The motivation for these practices was “vengeance on the immediate 
offender” and the resulting judicial process was “expressly directed against the object, 
animate or inanimate” (Holmes 1991, 10).   
For instance, a tree that fell and killed a person “was delivered to the relatives, or 
chopped to pieces for the gratification of the real or simulated passion” (Holmes 1991, 
11).  Similarly, in Southern Asia, if a tiger killed a man, his family was disgraced until 
“they had retaliated by killing and eating the tiger,” and “if a man was killed by a fall 
from a tree, his relatives would take their revenge by cutting the tree down, and scattering 
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it in chips” (Holmes 1991, 19).  Under English common law at the time of King Alfred, if 
a horse caused a man to drown, then the horse was surrendered; but if the horse caused 
the man to drown because the man compels “his horse to take the water,” the horse was 
not surrendered because the death was the man’s fault, not the horse’s fault (Holmes 
1991, 21).   
Even later, those in medieval England believed that “no difficulty was felt in 
treating animals as guilty” (Holmes 1991, 22; Blackstone 1765-1769, 300-02).  Consider 
the case of the dog Provetie.  In 1595, a dog bit a child’s finger while the child was 
playing with a piece of meat in his hand (Arthur 2006).  “The child later died and the dog 
was arrested, imprisoned, and condemned to death after a trial.  The court held that the 
dog be hanged by ‘a rope until death ensues’ and then taken to the gallows field, ‘to the 
deterring of other dogs and to all as an example.’  The dogs ‘goods, should he have any, 
[were] confiscated and forfeited for the benefit of the countship.”  These few accounts 
from history demonstrate that the objects qualifying as agents (in the sense relevant to 
morality), as well as the actions that trigger moral accountability, has not remained 
constant throughout history.137 
On Hume’s account, these differences should not be surprising.  Because our 
moral sentiments are, at base, a biological reaction rather than a reaction constituted by 
reason alone, it would seem more surprising if they had not changed over time.  
                                                 
137 Bernard Williams explains such differences as follows:  “We have conceptions of legal responsibility 
different from any such conception the Greeks had, but that is because we have a different conception of 
law—not, basically, a different conception of responsibility” (Williams 1993, 65).  Wallace also claims that 
there are instances in which we “hold people legally responsible without holding them morally responsible” 
(Wallace 1996, 70 n.27).  While there clearly is a difference between legal and moral responsibility—e.g., 
holding mentally impaired people civilly liable for damages to ensure that those with a stake in their estate 
will keep them from harming others—the examples Holmes cites do reflect views on moral responsibility, 
specifically views about fault.  A desire to make ancient practices comport with our own is not a reason to 
refuse to take these examples at face value. 
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Nietzsche (1967) makes the point a different way using social changes to provide an 
explanation:   
the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual 
employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever 
exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted 
to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power 
superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, and becoming 
master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh 
interpretation, and adaptation through which any previous “meaning” and 
“purpose” are necessarily obscured or even obliterated. (77) 
Whatever the explanation, history seems to confirm that what (we believe) qualifies as an 
agent or free action has changed over time.  
These considerations suggest that it was a mistake for Wallace to identify 
grasping and acting from moral reasons (abilities other animals and trees do not seem to 
have) as the essential aspect of agency and moral accountability.  In response, Wallace 
could simply hold that the examples cited are nothing more than examples of moral 
mistakes, and thus, such evidence does not negatively impact his views.  In fact, Wallace 
would likely use a distinction he draws between mere causal responsibility and moral 
responsibility to make this claim (Wallace 1996).  But this distinction merely explains 
why we (currently) would not consider inanimate objects and other animals morally 
accountable, as the examples cited indicate that historically the distinction Wallace draws 
has been rejected.  It is a virtue of Hume’s account that it straightforwardly explains these 
historical practices for what they appear to be on their face—reflections of moral views 
now rejected.  There is no reason to believe that, upon reflection, these societies would 
have rejected their practices were they made aware of the distinction Wallace draws.   
A second consideration in favor of Hume’s account is that by focusing upon 
grasping and acting from moral reasons, Wallace is open to the following response by 
105 
 
incompatibilists:  acting from moral reasons (just like having an action caused by one’s 
will) is not sufficient for an action to be free because to the extent causal necessity 
applies universally, it is unfair to hold anyone responsible for anything they do regardless 
of whether they possess these capacities  An example of one advancing this type of 
incompatibilist response is Ishtiyaque Haji.  Haji argues that insofar as Wallace’s theory 
makes a claim about the fairness of holding agents accountable for their actions, it adopts 
the principle that “ought implies can,” which is not satisfied if causal necessity applies 
(Haji 2002, 209).  Specifically, Haji argues that the following is a requirement for an 
action to be morally wrong in the first place:  “It is morally wrong for S to do [not to do] 
A only if S can refrain from doing [do] A” (Haji 2002, 209).  From this, Haji claims that 
if causal necessity “eradicates genuine alternatives, and wrong actions require such 
alternatives, then the truth of determinism implies that no actions (where action is broadly 
construed to include choices) are wrong” (Haji 2002, 209).  For this reason, Haji claims, 
it is unfair to hold agents accountable if causal necessity applies to their actions.   
Haji’s argument is nearly identical to incompatibilist arguments advanced in 
response to traditional compatibilists:  Haji’s argument can be summarized as roughly, 
for grasping and acting from moral reasons to have moral relevance, the supposed agent 
must have some control over what she grasps or over whether she acts on the moral 
reasons; whereas the typical response to traditional compatibilists is roughly, for the (type 
of) cause of the action to have moral relevance, the supposed agent must have some 
control over the cause itself.  A response is available to Wallace:  Wallace’s account 
better captures our concrete moral judgments concerning excuses for and exemptions 
from moral responsibility, which means that the principle involving alternative 
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possibilities that Haji cites requires independent justification; a justification, Wallace 
would claim, Haji cannot provide (Wallace 1996).   
For the point made here, it is not important whether Haji or Wallace ultimately 
has the better argument.  Instead, it is important to note only that if Wallace is correct, 
then the fact that causal necessity applies to actions we consider free has no moral 
relevance at all because it does not affect whether one grasps and acts from moral 
reasons.  Yet this conclusion fails to account for the common intuition Bramhall 
exploited (and almost all incompatibilists share) that causal necessity is at least relevant 
to assessing moral responsibility.  Wallace attempts to explain this intuition as part of a 
moral mistake, but, much like Wallace’s response to the historical examples, this 
response does not seem to take the intuition (which lingers nonetheless) seriously 
enough.   
The inadequacy of Wallace’s responses becomes more apparent in light of the fact 
that the change in which objects society considers agents has nothing to do with grasping 
and acting from moral reasons.  Instead, is likely the ability to understand the behavior of 
inanimate objects and other animals mechanistically that explains the historical changes.  
Any account that ultimately concludes causal necessity is wholly irrelevant to moral 
responsibility and agency fails to capture the very intuition upon which the 
compatibilist/incompatibilist debate rests.  For these reasons, such compatibilist solutions 
seem open to the charge that they simply beg all of the important questions.   
Much as Hume’s account mediates the Hobbes/Bramhall controversy, Hume’s 
account permits us to mediate the Wallace/Haji controversy.  Disputes over which objects 
are agents and which actions are free cannot be resolved in the abstract, but instead 
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present a contingent moral question dependent upon our moral sentiments.  
Considerations relevant to moral responsibility are those considerations that arouse our 
moral sentiments when we contemplate them.  Recognizing that causal necessity applies 
to all actions we consider free (just like recognizing the Creator ultimately caused all our 
actions) has little affect upon our moral ascriptions because “[t]he mind of man is so 
formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and 
actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame” (Hume 1975, 102).  
For this reason, Hume believes that, as a matter of fact, causal necessity is not a threat to 
moral responsibility or agency.  By Hume’s own standards, however, this is a contingent 
fact.   
For Hume, disputes over whether causal necessity precludes moral responsibility 
are (at base) not different from disputes over whether a certain upbringing excuses 
subsequent bad acts in our criminal justice system or whether a genetic predisposition 
excuses certain behavior.  People of good faith can and do disagree about such matters.  
Even if we conclude that one’s upbringing does not excuse, it remains a morally relevant 
consideration.  Similarly, even if we conclude having a genetic predisposition to engage 
in certain behavior does not excuse, it also remains a morally relevant consideration.  In 
the same way, causal necessity remains morally relevant even if we conclude that it is not 
an excuse and does not exempt one from moral responsibility.   
Wallace is correct that, for example, insanity is different from causal necessity 
because the former exempts while the latter does not.  Wallace is incorrect, however, that 
to consider the latter an exemption is to make a mistake of reason by employing 
irrelevant considerations.  Haji is correct that Wallace simply ignores morally relevant 
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considerations—roughly, the eradication of genuine alternatives or the power to pursue 
them—but is incorrect that these considerations preclude moral responsibility and agency 
altogether.  Haji is entitled to claim only that these considerations are morally relevant 
insofar as they affect moral sentiments, not that these considerations are dispositive.   
Causal necessity is compatible with moral accountability and agency because moral 
sentiments survive contemplation of the implications of causal necessity.  However, this 
“victory” by compatibilists is not absolute, and cannot be.  Because our moral sentiments 
change over time, the relationship between causal necessity on the one hand and agency 
and actions we consider free on the other hand also could change over time.  Thus, while 
compatibilists seem to have the upper hand, the most they can claim is that hard 
determinists are currently mistaken, which, after all, is all that is needed. 
 
Conclusion 
The legal lesson in this discussion is that current trends to treat brain science as 
dispositive of issues concerning legal accountability should be viewed with great 
skepticism.  Such science must be filtered morally to have relevance to accountability, 
which means such science should not be used to show, for example, compulsion as a 
matter of law to excuse otherwise criminal behavior or that it would be unconstitutional 
to hold someone legally culpable given their brain state.  Instead, science is relevant for 
juries determining guilt and policymakers who inject moral considerations into law.  
While legal scholars are correct to insist that discussions of free will remain relevant to 
criminal law, they are incorrect that those discussions should examine free will from a 
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metaphysical, rather than a moral, perspective (Kaye 2007).  Philosophy once again 








There are limits to how much light philosophy can shed on legal issues.  While 
the methods of philosophy are valuable to those analyzing law, the conclusions of 
philosophers are more likely to cause confusion than clarity if they are imported into the 
decisions judges make in interpreting law.  The primary problem exemplified in this 
dissertation is confusing a conceptual issue for a practical one.   
For example, while philosophy of language is useful in understanding the nature 
of language, it is of limited use in shedding light on how we should understand and 
interpret language.  Language develops imprecisely because precise definitions are hardly 
ever required in ordinary language, so we should not be surprised when attempts to 
provide precise definitions to address legal issues consist of creating precision instead of 
discovering precision.  And we should not be surprised when normative considerations 
creep into our creating that precision.  For that reason, attempts to solve legal issues with 
precise definitions tend to obscure normative issues lurking in the background, which in 
turn results in more confusion, not more clarity.   
Hopefully, this dissertation has provided reasons to think through the limits of 
interdisciplinary work, but not to question its value.  The message is not “stop,” but 
“proceed with caution.”  Discovering the limits of a discipline or theory does not limit its 
usefulness, but instead serves to ensure it is used properly.  In the end, those discoveries 
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